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Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data †
By Ralph Ossa *
How large are optimal tariffs? What tariffs would prevail in a world-
wide trade war? How costly would a breakdown of international 
trade policy cooperation be? And what is the scope for future mul-
tilateral trade negotiations? I address these and other questions 
using a unified framework which nests traditional, new trade, and 
political economy motives for protection. I find that optimal tariffs 
average 62 percent, world trade war tariffs average 63 percent, the 
government welfare losses from a breakdown of international trade 
policy cooperation average 2.9 percent, and the possible government 
welfare gains from future multilateral trade negotiations average 
0.5 percent. (JEL F12, F13, O19)
I propose a flexible framework for the quantitative analysis of noncooperative 
and cooperative trade policy. It is based on a multi-country multi-industry general 
equilibrium model of international trade featuring inter-industry trade as in Ricardo 
(1817), intra-industry trade as in Krugman (1980), and special interest politics as 
in Grossman and Helpman (1994). By combining these elements, it takes a uni-
fied view of trade policy which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy 
motives for protection. Specifically, it features import tariffs which serve to manipu-
late the terms-of-trade, shift profits away from other countries, and protect politi-
cally influential industries. It can be easily calibrated to match industry-level tariffs 
and trade.
I use this framework to provide a first comprehensive quantitative analysis of 
noncooperative and cooperative trade policy, focusing on the main players in recent 
GATT/WTO negotiations. I begin by considering optimal tariffs, i.e., the tariffs 
countries would impose if they did not have to fear any retaliation. I find that each 
country can gain considerably at the expense of other countries by unilaterally 
imposing optimal tariffs. In the complete version with lobbying, the mean welfare 
gain of the tariff imposing government is 1.9 percent, the mean welfare loss of the 
other governments is −0.7 percent, and the average optimal tariff is 62.4 percent. 
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These averages are of a comparable magnitude in the baseline version in which 
political economy forces are not taken into account.
I then turn to an analysis of Nash tariffs, i.e., the tariffs countries would impose 
in a worldwide trade war in which their trading partners retaliated optimally. I find 
that countries can then no longer benefit at the expense of one another and welfare 
falls across the board so that nobody is winning the trade war. Intuitively, each coun-
try is imposing import tariffs in an attempt to induce favorable terms-of-trade and 
profit shifting effects. The end result is a large drop in trade volumes which is leav-
ing everybody worse off. In the complete version with lobbying, the mean govern-
ment welfare loss is −2.9 percent and the average Nash tariff is 63.4 percent. These 
averages are again quite similar in the baseline version in which political economy 
forces are not taken into account.
I finally investigate cooperative tariffs, i.e., the tariffs countries would negotiate to 
in efficient trade negotiations. I consider trade negotiations starting at Nash tariffs, 
factual tariffs, and zero tariffs following a Nash bargaining protocol. I find that trade 
negotiations yield significant welfare gains, that a large share of these gains has been 
reaped during past trade negotiations, and that free trade is close to the efficiency 
frontier. In the complete version with lobbying, trade negotiations starting at Nash tar-
iffs, factual tariff, and zero tariffs yield average government welfare gains of 3.6 per-
cent, 0.5 percent, and 0.2 percent, respectively. These averages are again quite similar 
in the baseline version in which political economy forces are not taken into account.
I am unaware of any quantitative analysis of noncooperative and cooperative trade 
policy which is comparable in terms of its scope. I believe that this is the first quantita-
tive framework which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for 
protection. Likewise, there is no precedent for estimating noncooperative and coop-
erative tariffs at the industry level for the major players in recent GATT/WTO nego-
tiations. The surprising lack of comparable work is most likely rooted in  long-binding 
methodological and computational constraints. In particular, the calibration of general 
equilibrium trade models has only been widely embraced quite recently following the 
seminal work of Eaton and Kortum (2002). Also, the calculation of disaggregated 
noncooperative and cooperative tariffs is very demanding computationally and was 
simply not feasible without present-day algorithms and computers.
The most immediate predecessors are Perroni and Whalley (2000); Broda, Limao, 
and Weinstein (2008); and Ossa (2011). Perroni and Whalley (2000) provide quan-
titative estimates of noncooperative tariffs in a simple Armington model which fea-
tures only traditional terms-of-trade effects. Ossa (2011) provides such estimates 
in a simple Krugman (1980) model which features only new trade production relo-
cation effects. Both contributions allow trade policy to operate only at the most 
aggregate level so that a single tariff is assumed to apply against all imports from 
any given country.1 Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) provide detailed statistical 
estimates of the inverse export supply elasticities faced by a number of non-WTO 
member countries. The idea is to test the traditional optimal tariff formula which 
1 Neither contribution computes cooperative tariffs. The work of Perroni and Whalley (2000) is in the comput-
able general equilibrium tradition and extends an earlier contribution by Hamilton and Whalley (1983). It predicts 
implausibly high noncooperative tariffs of up to 1,000 percent. See also Markusen and Wigle (1989) and Ossa 
(2012a).
10_A20120527_10412.indd   4105 11/11/14   3:25 PM
4106 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW dECEMbER 2014
states that a country’s optimal tariff is equal to the inverse export supply elasticity it 
faces in equilibrium.2
The paper further relates to an extensive body of theoretical and quantitative 
work. The individual motives for protection are taken from the theoretical trade 
policy literature including Johnson (1953–1954); Venables (1987); and Grossman 
and Helpman (1994).3 The analysis of trade negotiations builds on a line of research 
synthesized by Bagwell and Staiger (2002). My calibration technique is similar to 
the one used in recent quantitative work based on the Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
model such as Caliendo and Parro (forthcoming). However, my analysis differs 
from this work in terms of question and framework. In particular, I go beyond an 
investigation of exogenous trade policy changes by emphasizing noncooperative 
and cooperative tariffs.4 Also, I take a unified view of trade policy by nesting tradi-
tional, new trade, and political economy effects.
My application focuses on 7 regions and 33 industries in the year 2007. The 
regions are Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Japan, the United States, and 
a residual Rest of the World and are chosen to comprise the main players in recent 
GATT/WTO negotiations. The industries span the agricultural and manufactur-
ing sectors of the economy. My main data source is the most recent Global Trade 
Analysis Project database (GTAP 8) from which I take industry-level trade, produc-
tion, and tariff data. In addition, I use the United Nations’ (UN) Comtrade trade 
data for the time period 1994–2008 for my estimation of demand elasticities, and 
the International Trade Centre’s Market Access Map tariff data as well as the UN’s 
TRAINS tariff data for my calibration of political economy weights. A detailed dis-
cussion of the data including the applied aggregation and matching procedures can 
be found in the Appendix.
To set the stage for a transparent presentation of the theory, it is useful to discuss 
the elasticity estimation up-front. As will become clear shortly, I need industry-level 
estimates of CES demand elasticities which do not vary by country. I obtain such 
estimates by applying the well-known Feenstra (1994) method to the UN trade data 
pooled across the main importers considered in my analysis. The results are listed 
in Table 1. As can be seen, the variation in the elasticities appears plausible with 
homogeneous goods such as wheat and rice having the largest values. Moreover, the 
mean elasticity of 3.4 is within the range of previous findings in the literature, and 
I will also consider various scalings as sensitivity checks. The interested reader can 
find a more detailed discussion of the elasticity estimation in the Appendix.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I first lay out the basic setup, 
characterize the equilibrium for given tariffs, demonstrate how to compute the 
2 This approach is not suitable for estimating the optimal tariffs of WTO member countries. This is because such 
countries impose cooperative tariffs so that the factual inverse export supply elasticities they face are not informa-
tive of the counterfactual inverse export supply elasticities they would face if they imposed optimal tariffs under all 
but the most restrictive assumptions.
3 Mathematically, the analyzed profit shifting effect is more closely related to the production relocation effect 
in Venables (1987) than the classic profit shifting effect in Brander and Spencer (1981). This is explained in more 
detail in footnote 12. See Mrazova (2011) for a recent treatment of profit shifting effects in the context of GATT/
WTO negotiations.
4 Existing work typically focuses on quantifying the effects of exogenous tariff changes. Caliendo and Parro 
(forthcoming), for example, analyze the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement. One exception can 
be found in the work of Alvarez and Lucas (2007) which includes a short discussion of optimal tariffs in small open 
economies.
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 general equilibrium effects of tariff changes, and discuss the welfare effects of tariff 
changes. I then turn to optimal tariffs, world trade wars, and world trade talks.
I. Basic Setup
There are N countries indexed by i or j and S industries indexed by s. Consumers 
have access to a continuum of differentiated varieties. Preferences over these variet-
ies are given by the following utility functions:
(1)   U j =  ∏ 
s
 
 
  ( ∑ 
i
 
 
 ∫ 
0
  M is   x ijs  ( ν is )  
 σ s −1 _ σ s    d ν is )   σ s  _  σ s −1  μ js  ,
Table 1—Parameter Estimates
 σ s  λ BRA  λ CHN  λ EU  λ IND  λ JPN  λ ROW  λ US 
Wheat 10.07 1.29 1.68 1.66 1.67 1.91 1.27 1.24
Rice 7.01 1.23 1.64 1.51 1.38 1.91 1.23 1.19
Dairy 5.89 1.24 1.29 1.56 1.29 1.46 1.25 1.34
Wearing apparel 5.39 1.29 1.46 1.22 1.13 1.03 1.22 1.48
Other metals 4.47 1.11 0.80 1.06 1.05 0.94 1.08 1.16
Vegetable oils, etc. 4.03 1.13 1.19 1.09 1.50 0.96 1.08 1.03
Bovine meat products 3.89 1.05 1.16 1.44 1.05 0.95 1.11 1.07
Leather products 3.67 1.18 1.13 1.06 0.97 1.17 1.08 1.22
Ferrous metals 3.67 1.10 0.73 1.04 1.04 0.90 1.03 1.09
Other manufactures 3.53 1.15 1.22 1.06 1.00 0.86 1.04 1.23
Other cereal grains 3.32 0.98 1.22 1.26 1.04 1.72 1.41 0.91
Oil seeds 3.21 0.97 1.01 0.87 1.20 1.79 1.20 1.04
Other meat products 3.20 1.03 1.09 1.12 1.04 0.91 1.11 0.96
Beverages and tobacco products 2.92 1.01 1.45 1.28 1.51 0.93 1.09 1.24
Bovine cattle, etc. 2.91 0.92 0.56 1.07 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.81
Textiles 2.87 1.04 1.19 0.96 0.91 0.82 0.99 1.26
Other transport equipment 2.84 0.91 0.76 0.94 0.74 0.73 0.90 1.03
Plant-based fibers 2.80 0.96 0.58 0.77 0.82 0.73 0.90 0.81
Wool, etc. 2.76 0.91 0.85 0.00 0.86 1.37 0.91 0.64
Motor vehicles, etc. 2.75 0.99 1.18 0.99 0.96 0.73 0.92 0.90
Metal products 2.70 1.01 0.96 0.94 0.84 0.75 0.91 1.06
Sugar 2.69 0.92 1.22 1.10 1.34 1.27 1.00 0.85
Other food products 2.62 0.90 1.01 0.98 1.05 0.93 0.96 0.89
Paper products, etc. 2.56 0.93 0.67 0.88 0.81 0.73 0.86 0.91
Other crops 2.53 0.92 0.64 0.87 1.12 0.74 0.93 0.80
Electronic equipment 2.49 0.91 0.82 0.87 0.61 0.66 0.84 1.00
Other mineral products 2.47 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.80 0.72 0.89 1.02
Other machinery, etc. 2.46 0.94 0.76 0.86 0.79 0.73 0.83 1.00
Vegetables, etc. 2.42 0.82 0.96 0.83 1.01 0.90 0.90 0.80
Chemical products, etc. 2.34 0.85 0.74 0.84 0.73 0.71 0.81 0.96
Wood products 2.32 0.90 0.77 0.79 0.72 0.71 0.83 0.90
Forestry 2.20 0.77 0.78 0.66 0.61 0.70 0.76 0.61
Other animal products 1.91 0.68 0.59 0.56 0.50 0.72 0.73 0.53
Mean 3.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: The entries under “ σ s ” are the estimated elasticities of substitution. The entries under “ λ BRA ” until “ λ US ” 
are the estimated political economy weights for each country which are scaled to have a mean of one. The boxes 
highlight the industries with the five highest values of λ for each country.
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where  x ijs is the quantity of an industry s variety from country i consumed in coun-
try j,  M is is the mass of industry s varieties produced in country i,  σ s > 1 is the elas-
ticity of substitution between industry s varieties, and  μ js is the fraction of country j 
income spent on industry s varieties.
Each variety is uniquely associated with an individual firm. Firms are homoge-
neous within industries and their technologies are summarized by the following 
inverse production functions:
(2)   l is =  ∑ 
j
 
 
  θ ijs  x ijs  _ φ is   ,
where  l is is the labor requirement of an industry s firm in country i featuring iceberg 
trade barriers  θ ijs and a productivity parameter  φ is . Each firm has monopoly power 
with respect to its own variety and the number of firms is given exogenously.5
Governments can impose import tariffs but do not have access to other pol-
icy instruments.6 I denote the ad valorem tariff imposed by country j against 
imports from country i in industry s by  t ijs and make frequent use of the shorthand 
 τ ijs ≡  t ijs + 1 throughout. Government preferences are given by the following objec-
tive functions:
(3)   G j =  ∑ 
s
 
 
  λ js  W js ,
where  W js is the welfare of industry s in country j and  λ js ≥ 0 is the political economy 
weight of industry s in country j which is scaled such that  1 _ S  ∑ s   λ js = 1. Welfare 
is given by real income in this setup which can be defined at the industry level, 
 W js ≡   X js  _ P j   , and at the aggregate level,  W j ≡  
 X j 
 _  P j , where  X js is the nominal income in 
industry s of country j,  P j is the ideal price index in country j, and  X j =  ∑ s   X js .  X js 
consists of industry labor income, industry profits, and a share of aggregate tariff 
revenue, which I assume to be allocated to industries based on employment shares.7
Notice that governments simply maximize welfare if the political economy 
weights are set equal to one since  W j =  ∑ s   W js . The interpretation of the political 
economy weights is that one dollar of income accruing to industry s of country j 
counts  λ js as much in the government’s objective function as one dollar of income 
accruing to an industry which receives average political support. This formulation 
of government preferences can be viewed as a reduced form representation of the 
5 The model can also be solved and calibrated with free entry and fixed costs of production. I focus on a version 
without free entry for two main reasons. First, because it features positive profits and therefore lends itself more 
naturally to an analysis of political economy considerations. Second, because it rules out corner solutions with zero 
production in some sectors so that it can be implemented using a much simpler algorithm. See footnote 12 for a 
further discussion of the model with free entry.
6 This restriction is motivated by the fact that import tariffs have always been by far the most important trade 
policy instruments in practice. However, it would be easy to extend the framework to also include export subsidies, 
import quotas, or voluntary export restraints. See Bagwell and Staiger (2009, 2012) for a discussion of the impor-
tance of this restriction for the theory of trade agreements in a range of simple new trade models.
7 To be clear,  X js =  w j  L js +  π js +   L js  _  L j  T R j , where  w j is the wage rate in country j,  L js is employment in industry s 
of country j,  π js are the profits in industry s of country j,  L j is total employment in country j, and T R j is the tariff 
revenue of country j.
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“protection for sale” theory of Grossman and Helpman (1994). However, it takes a 
somewhat broader approach by taking producer interests and worker interests into 
account. As will become clear shortly, industry profits and industry labor income are 
proportional to industry sales so that this is the margin special interest groups seek 
to affect.
II. Equilibrium for Given Tariffs
Utility maximization implies that firms in industry s of country i face demands
(4)   x ijs =   ( p is  θ ijs  τ ijs ) 
− σ s  
  _ P js 1− σ s     μ js  X j ,
where  p is is the ex-factory price of an industry s variety from country i and  P js is the 
ideal price index of industry s varieties in country j. Also, profit maximization requires 
that firms in industry s of country i charge a constant markup over marginal costs
(5)   p is =   σ s  _  σ s − 1  
 w i  _  φ is  ,
where  w i is the wage rate in country i.
The equilibrium for given tariffs can be characterized with four condensed equilib-
rium conditions. The first condition follows from substituting equations (2), (4), and 
(5) into the relationship defining industry profits  π is =  M is  ( ∑ j   p is  θ ijs  x ijs −  w i  l is ) :
(6)   π is =  1 _  σ s   ∑ j 
 
 M is  τ ijs − σ s   (  σ s  _  σ s − 1   θ ijs  _ φ is    w i  _  P js  ) 1− σ s   μ js  X j .
The second condition combines equations (2), (4), and (5) with the requirement for 
labor market clearing  L i =  ∑ s   M is  l is :
(7)   w i  L i =  ∑ 
s
 
 
  π is  ( σ s − 1 ) .
The third condition results from substituting equation (5) into the formula for the 
ideal price index  P js =  ( ∑ i   M is  ( p is  θ ijs  τ ijs ) 1− σ s  )  1 _ 1− σ s   :
(8)   P js =  ( ∑ 
i
 
 
 M is  (  σ s  _  σ s − 1   w i  θ ijs  τ ijs  _ φ is   ) 1− σ s  )  1 _ 1− σ s   .
And the final condition combines equations (4) and (5) with the budget constraint 
equating total expenditure to labor income, plus tariff revenue, plus aggregate profits:
(9)   X j =  w j  L j +  ∑ 
i
 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
  t ijs  M is  τ ijs − σ s   (  σ s  _  σ s − 1   θ ijs  _ φ is    w i  _  P js  ) 1− σ s   μ js  X j +  ∑ s    π js .
Conditions (6)–(9) represent a system of 2N ( S + 1 ) equations in the 2N ( S + 1 ) 
unknowns  w i ,  X i ,  P is , and  π is which can be solved given a numeraire. An obvious 
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problem, however, is that this system depends on the set of unknown parameters 
 {  M is ,  θ ijs ,  φ is } which are all difficult to estimate empirically.
III. General Equilibrium Effects of Tariff Changes
I avoid this problem by computing the general equilibrium effects of counterfac-
tual tariff changes using a method inspired by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007). In 
particular, conditions (6)–(9) can be rewritten in changes as
(10)     πis =  ∑ 
j
 
 
 α ijs  (  τijs ) − σ s   (   wi  _   Pjs  ) 1− σ s    Xj 
(11)   wi =  ∑ 
s
 
 
  δ is   πis 
(12)   Pjs =  ( ∑ 
i
 
 
 γ ijs  (  wi   τijs ) 1− σ s  )  1 _ 1− σ s   
(13)   Xj =   w j  L j  _ X j     wj +  ∑ i 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   t ijs  T ijs  _ X j     t ijs  (  τijs ) 
− σ s   (   wi  _   Pjs  ) 1− σ s    Xj +  ∑ s     π js  _ X j     πjs ,
where a “hat” denotes the ratio between the counterfactual and the fac-
tual value,  α ijs   ≡   T ijs / ∑ n   T ins ,  γ ijs   ≡   ( τ ijs  T ijs ) / ( ∑ m   τ mjs  T mjs ) ,  δ is   ≡   
 ( ∑ j    σ s − 1 _ σ s    T ijs ) / ( ∑ t   ∑ n    σ t − 1 _ σ t    T int  ) , and  T ijs ≡  M is  (  σ s  _  σ s − 1   θ ijs  _ φ is    w i  _  P js  ) 1− σ s   τ ijs − σ s   μ js  X j 
is the factual value of industry s trade flowing from country i to country j evaluated 
at world prices.
Equations (10)–(13) represent a system of 2N ( S + 1 ) equations in the 2N ( S + 1 ) 
unknowns   wi ,   Xi ,   Pis ,   πis . Crucially, their coefficients depend on  σ s and observables 
only so that the full general equilibrium response to counterfactual tariff changes 
can be computed without further information on any of the remaining model param-
eters. Moreover, all required observables can be inferred directly from widely 
available trade and tariff data since the model requires  X j =  ∑ i   ∑ s   τ ijs  T ijs and 
 w j  L j =  X j −  ∑ i   ∑ s   t ijs T ijs −  ∑ s   π js , where  π is =  1 _  σ s   ∑ j   T ijs in this constant markup 
environment.8
Notice that this procedure also ensures that the counterfactual effects of tariff 
changes are computed from a reference point which perfectly matches  industry-level 
trade and tariffs. Essentially, it imposes a restriction on the set of unknown parame-
ters  {  M is ,  θ ijs ,  φ is } such that the predicted  T ijs perfectly match the observed  T ijs given 
the observed  τ ijs and the estimated  σ s . It is important to emphasize that the restriction 
on  {  M is ,  θ ijs ,  φ is } does not deliver estimates of  {  M is ,  θ ijs ,  φ is } given the high dimen-
sionality of the parameter space. To obtain estimates of  {  M is ,  θ ijs ,  φ is } , one would 
8 Notice that this system can be reduced to 2N equations in the 2N unknowns   wi and   Xi , by substituting for   πis 
and   Pjs in conditions (11) and (13) using conditions (10) and (12). I work with this condensed system in my numer-
ical analysis to improve computational efficiency.
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have to reduce this dimensionality, for example, by imposing some structure on the 
matrix of iceberg trade barriers.9
One issue with equations (10)–(13) is that they are based on a static model which 
does not allow for aggregate trade imbalances thereby violating the data. The stan-
dard way of addressing this issue is to introduce aggregate trade imbalances as con-
stant nominal transfers into the budget constraints. However, this approach has two 
serious limitations which have gone largely unnoticed by the literature. First, the 
assumption of constant aggregate trade imbalances leads to extreme general equilib-
rium adjustments in response to high tariffs and cannot be true in the limit as tariffs 
approach infinity. Second, the assumption of constant nominal transfers implies that 
it matters what nominal units they are measured in since this affects how real trans-
fers change in counterfactuals.10
To circumvent these limitations, I first purge the original data from aggregate 
trade imbalances using my model and then conduct all subsequent analyses using 
this purged dataset. The first step is essentially a replication of the original Dekle, 
Eaton, and Kortum (2007) exercise using my setup. In particular, I introduce aggre-
gate trade imbalances as nominal transfers into the budget constraint and calculate 
the general equilibrium responses of setting those transfers equal to zero which 
allows me to construct a matrix of trade flows featuring no aggregate trade imbal-
ances. I discuss this procedure and its advantages as well as the first-stage results in 
more detail in the Appendix.
As an illustration of the key general equilibrium effects of trade policy, panel A of 
Table 2 summarizes the effects of a counterfactual 50 percentage point increase in 
the US tariff on chemicals or apparel. Chemical products have a relatively low elas-
ticity of substitution of 2.34 while apparel products have a relatively high elasticity 
of substitution of 5.39. The first column gives the predicted percentage change in 
the US wage relative to the numeraire. As can be seen, the US wage is predicted to 
increase by 1.45 percent if the tariff increase occurs in chemicals and is predicted to 
increase by 0.67 percent if the tariff increase occurs in apparel.
The second column presents the predicted percentage change in the quantity of 
US output in the protected industry and the third column the simple average of the pre-
dicted percentage changes in the quantity of US output in the other industries. Hence, 
US output is predicted to increase by 5.73 percent in chemicals and decrease by an 
average 1.40 percent in all other industries if the tariff increase occurs in chemicals. 
Similarly, US output is predicted to increase by 33.35 percent in apparel and decrease 
by an average 0.97 percent in all other industries if the tariff increase occurs in apparel.
Intuitively, a US import tariff makes imported goods relatively more expensive in 
the US market so that US consumers shift expenditure toward US goods. This then 
incentivizes US firms in the protected industry to expand, which bids up US wages and 
thereby forces US firms in other industries to contract. Even though it is not directly 
implied by Table 2, it should be clear that mirroring adjustments occur in other coun-
tries. In particular, firms in the industry in which the United States imposes import 
tariffs contract, which depresses wages and allows firms in other industries to expand.
9 I do not further pursue an estimation of  {  M is ,  θ ijs ,  φ is } in this paper, since the model relates  T ijs and 
 {  M is ,  θ ijs ,  φ is } with a standard gravity equation whose empirical success is widely known.
10 This is explained in more detail in the Appendix.
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IV. Welfare Effects of Tariff Changes
Given the general equilibrium effects of tariff changes, the implied welfare 
effects can be computed from   W j =   Xj /  Pj , where   Pj =  Π s  (  Pjs )  μ js  is the change in 
the aggregate price index. This framework features both traditional as well as new 
trade welfare effects of trade policy. This can be seen most clearly from a log-lin-
ear approximation around factuals. As I explain in detail in the Appendix, it yields 
the following relationship for the welfare change induced by tariff changes, where 
 
Δ W j 
 _ W j   is the percentage change in country j ’s welfare and so on:11
(14)   Δ W j  _ W j   ≈  ∑ i 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   T ijs  _ X j    ( Δ p js  _ p js   −  Δ p is  _ p is   ) 
 +  ∑ 
s
 
 
   π js  _ X j    ( Δ π js  _ π js   −  Δ p js  _ p js   ) 
 +  ∑ 
i
 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   t ijs  T ijs  _ X j    ( Δ T ijs  _ T ijs   −  Δ p is  _ p is   ) .
The first term is a traditional terms-of-trade effect which captures changes in coun-
try j ’s real income due to differential changes in the world prices of country j ’s 
production and consumption bundles. Country j benefits from an increase in the 
world prices of its production bundle relative to the world prices of its  consumption 
11 As will become clear shortly, this welfare decomposition emphasizes international trade policy externalities 
by focusing on terms-of-trade effects and profit shifting effects. While this seems most useful for the purpose of 
this paper, one can also derive an alternative decomposition which highlights the distributional effects of trade 
policy. In particular, since nominal income consists of wage income  ( w j  L j ) , industry profits  ( π js ) , and tariff revenue 
 ( R j ) , changes in real income can be decomposed as   W j =   w j  L j  _ X j    
  wj 
 _   Pj +  ∑ s 
   π js  _  X j   
  πjs 
 _   Pj  +  
 R j 
 _  X j  
  Rj 
 _   Pj . If one equates the notion 
of “consumer” with the notion of “worker,” the first term can be interpreted as a weighted change in consumer 
surplus, the second as a weighted change in producer surplus, and the third as a weighted change in government 
surplus.
Table 2—Effects of 50 Percentage Point Increase in US Tariff
Δ US wage Δ US production (protected) Δ US production (other)
Panel A. General equilibrium effects
Chemicals 1.45 5.73 −1.40
Apparel 0.67 33.35 −0.97
Δ US welfare Terms-of-trade effect Profit shifting effect
Panel B. Welfare effects
Chemicals 0.17 0.34 0.12
Apparel −0.14 0.16 −0.15
Notes: The entries in panel A are the percentage change in the US wage normalized such that the average wage 
change across all countries is zero (column 1), the percentage change in the quantity of output in the US chemi-
cals or apparel industry (column 2), and the average of the percentage changes in the quantity of output in the other 
US industries (column 3). The entries in panel B are the percentage change in US welfare (column 1), the compo-
nent due to  terms-of-trade effects (column 2), and the component due to profit shifting effects (column 3). The val-
ues in column 2 and 3 do not add up to the value in column 1 because they are computed using equation (14) which 
is a linear approximation. Here, all changes are computed relative to factual tariffs.
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bundle because its exports then command more imports in world markets. The 
 terms-of-trade effect can also be viewed as a relative wage effect since world prices 
are proportional to wages given the constant markup pricing captured by formula (5).
Notice that this equivalence between terms-of-trade effects and relative wage 
effects implies that changes in tariffs always change the terms-of-trade in all indus-
tries at the same time. This is because a tariff in a particular industry can only affect 
the terms-of-trade in that industry if it changes relative wages in which case it then 
also alters the terms-of-trade in all other industries. This would no longer be true if 
the tight connection between prices across industries within countries was broken 
by allowing for variable markups, changing marginal costs, or more than one per-
fectly mobile factor of production.
The second term is a new trade profit shifting effect which captures changes in 
country j ’s real income due to changes in country j ’s aggregate profits originat-
ing from changes in industry output. It takes changes in industry profits, nets out 
changes in industry prices, and then aggregates the remaining changes over all 
industries using profit shares as weights. These remaining changes are changes in 
industry profits originating from changes in industry output since industry profits 
are proportional to industry sales in this constant markup environment.12
The last term is a combined trade volume effect which captures changes in coun-
try j ’s real income due to changes in country j ’s tariff revenue originating from 
changes in import volumes. It takes changes in import values, nets out changes in 
import prices, and then aggregates the remaining changes over all countries and 
industries using tariff revenue shares as weights. These remaining changes are 
changes in import volumes since changes in import values can be decomposed into 
changes in import prices and import volumes.13
As an illustration, panel B of Table 2 reports the welfare effects of the counter-
factual 50 percentage point increase in the US tariff on chemicals or apparel and 
decomposes them into terms-of-trade and profit shifting components following equa-
tion (14). As can be seen, US welfare increases by 0.17 percent if the tariff increase 
occurs in chemicals but decreases by 0.14 percent if the tariff increase occurs in 
apparel. The differential welfare effects are due to differential profit shifting effects. 
While the terms-of-trade effect is positive in both cases, the profit  shifting effect is 
positive if the tariff increase occurs in chemicals and negative if the profit increase 
occurs in apparel.
12 While this effect is similar to the classic profit shifting effect from Brander and Spencer (1981), there is also 
a close mathematical connection to the production relocation effect from Venables (1987). It can be shown that 
in a version of the model with free entry and fixed costs of production, the equivalent of equation (14) would be 
 Δ V j  _ V j   ≈  ∑ i 
  ∑ s    T ijs  _  X j   ( Δ p js  _ p js   −  Δ p is  _ p is   ) +  ∑ i   ∑ s    τ ijs  T ijs  _ X j    1 _  σ s − 1  Δ M is  _ M is   +  ∑ i   ∑ s    t ijs  T ijs  _ X j    ( Δ T ijs  _ T ijs   −  Δ p is  _ p is   ) , where the second 
term can now be interpreted as a production relocation effect. Essentially, tariffs lead to changes in industry output 
at the intensive margin without free entry and at the extensive margin with free entry.
13 Readers familiar with the analysis of Flam and Helpman (1987) may wonder why decomposition (14) does 
not reveal that tariffs can also be used to partially correct for a domestic distortion brought about by cross-industry 
differences in markups. The reason is simply that this decomposition only captures first-order effects, while the 
Flam and Helpman (1987) corrections operate through second-order adjustments in expenditure shares. As will 
become clear in the discussion of efficient tariffs, they always push governments to impose somewhat higher tar-
iffs on higher elasticity goods in an attempt to counteract distortions in relative prices. While I take this force into 
account in all my calculations, I only emphasize it in the discussion of efficient tariffs, as the key channels through 
which countries can gain at the expense of one another are terms-of-trade and profit shifting effects.
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The positive terms-of-trade effects are a direct consequence of the increase in the 
US relative wage identified above. The differential profit shifting effects are the result 
of cross-industry differences in markups which are brought about by  cross-industry 
differences in the elasticity of substitution. Since the quantity of US output always 
increases in the protected industry but decreases in other industries, the change in 
profits which is due to changes in industry output is always positive in the protected 
industry but negative in other industries. The overall profit shifting effect depends 
on the net effect which is positive if the tariff increase occurs in a high profitability 
industry such as chemicals and negative if it occurs in a low profitability industry 
such as apparel.14
Notice that the overall welfare effects are smaller than the sum of the  terms-of-trade 
and profit shifting effects in both examples. One missing factor is, of course, the 
trade volume effect from equation (14). However, this effect is close to zero in both 
examples since the loss in tariff revenue due to a decrease in import volumes in the 
protected industry is approximately offset by the gain in tariff revenue due to an 
increase in import volumes in other industries. The discrepancy therefore largely 
reflects the fact that equation (14) only provides a rough approximation if tariff 
changes are as large as 50 percentage points since it is obtained from a linearization 
around factuals.15
To put these and all following welfare statements into perspective, it seems useful 
to provide a sense of the magnitude of the gains from trade. As I explain in detail 
in Ossa (2012b), the gains from trade are typically larger in multi-sector models 
than in their single-sector equivalents because they avoid an aggregation bias stem-
ming from cross-industry heterogeneity in the trade elasticities. This model is no 
exception and predicts welfare losses of moving from factual tariffs to autarky of 
−9.9 percent for Brazil, −12.9 percent for China, −12.3 percent for the European 
Union, −10.8 percent for India, −13.0 percent for Japan, −20.8 percent for the Rest 
of the World, and −13.5 percent for the United States.16
V. Optimal Tariffs
The above discussion suggests that governments have incentives to use import 
tariffs to increase relative wages generating a positive terms-of-trade effect and 
expand high-profitability industries generating a positive profit shifting effect. 
However, these incentives combine with political economy considerations as gov-
ernments also seek to favor politically influential industries. In particular, govern-
ments grant extra protection to high  λ is industries as this increases industry revenue 
by increasing industry sales. Recall from above that producers and workers simply 
split industry revenue using the constant shares  1 _  σ s  and 1 −  1 _  σ s  . As a result, there is 
14 As is easy to verify, equations (5) and (11) imply that  ∑ s    π js  _  X j   ( Δ π js  _ π js   −  Δ p js  _ p js   ) = 0 if  σ s = σ for all s so that 
there is then no profit shifting effect.
15 In particular, the overall reduction in imports associated with the increase in tariffs also reduces the import 
shares which leverage the improvement in relative world prices. This effect does not appear in equation (14) since 
changes in import shares are second order effects.
16 The welfare losses of moving from free trade to autarky are −10.0 percent for Brazil, −13.1 percent for China, 
−12.6 percent for the European Union, −11.2 percent for India, −15.4 percent for Japan, −20.8 percent for the 
Rest of the World, and −14.2 percent for the United States. Most of the variation in the gains from trade is due to 
variation in trade openness, just as in Ossa (2012b).
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no conflict of interest between producers and workers with respect to trade policy 
in this environment.
I compute optimal tariffs using the Su and Judd (2012) method of mathematical 
programming with equilibrium constraints, as I explain in detail in the Appendix. 
Essentially, it involves maximizing the government’s objective function (3) subject 
to the equilibrium conditions (10)–(13), which ensures relatively fast convergence 
despite the high dimensionality of the optimization problem. I begin by discussing 
optimal tariffs for the baseline version in which  λ is = 1 ∀ i and s. I then describe 
how I calibrate the political economy weights and present the political economy 
results. To be clear, optimal tariffs refer to tariffs countries would choose given all 
other countries’ factual tariffs. They are regarded as an important benchmark in the 
trade policy literature.
Figure 1 summarizes the optimal tariffs of each country for the baseline version 
in which  λ is = 1 ∀ i and s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and 
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Figure 1. Optimal Tariffs without Lobbying
Note: The median optimal tariffs are 60.3 percent for the United States, 56.1 percent for Brazil, 59.3 percent for 
China, 61.3 percent for the European Union, 54.0 percent for India, 59.6 percent for Japan, and 61.5 percent for 
the Rest of the World.
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plots the optimal tariffs of each country with respect to all trading partners against 
the industry rank. As can be seen, optimal tariffs vary widely across industries and 
are strongly decreasing in the elasticity of substitution, as one would expect given 
the profit shifting motive for protection.17 There is also some variation across coun-
tries and trading partners even though it is much less pronounced. Optimal tariffs 
are highly correlated across countries with the mean pairwise correlation coeffi-
cient being 91.2 percent. The median optimal tariff across all countries combined is 
58.9 percent.18
Panel A of Table 3 lists the effects of imposing the optimal tariffs from Figure 1 
individually for each country, always showing the effects on the tariff imposing 
17 Loosely speaking, governments choose the level of tariffs to optimally manipulate the terms-of-trade and the 
distribution of tariffs to optimally shift profits.
18 To be precise, this is the average of the median optimal tariffs reported in the note to Figure 1.
Table 3—Optimal Tariffs
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Own Other Own Other Own Other Own Other
Panel A. Optimal tariffs without lobbying
Brazil 1.1 −0.1 1.1 −0.1 18.2 −3.0 0.8 −0.0
China 1.8 −0.6 1.8 −0.6 17.6 −2.9 0.5 −0.1
European Union 1.9 −1.0 1.9 −1.0 22.5 −3.7 0.1 −0.2
India 1.7 −0.1 1.7 −0.1 8.7 −1.5 2.7 −0.1
Japan 4.0 −0.3 4.0 −0.3 18.6 −3.1 1.7 −0.1
Rest of World 2.9 −1.7 2.9 −1.7 19.0 −3.2 1.1 −0.6
United States 2.3 −0.9 2.3 −0.9 23.8 −4.0 0.6 −0.1
Mean 2.2 −0.7 2.2 −0.7 18.3 −3.1 1.1 −0.2
Panel B. Optimal tariffs with lobbying
Brazil 0.9 −0.1 1.0 −0.1 18.1 −3.0 0.3 −0.0
China 1.5 −0.4 1.5 −0.5 13.3 −2.2 0.1 −0.0
European Union 2.2 −1.2 1.7 −1.1 27.0 −4.5 −0.9 0.1
India 0.5 −0.0 0.7 −0.0 11.4 −1.9 0.6 −0.0
Japan 2.6 −0.4 1.0 −0.4 30.0 −5.0 −1.4 0.1
Rest of World 2.9 −1.7 2.6 −1.8 21.9 −3.7 −0.1 −0.2
United States 2.5 −0.9 2.1 −0.9 26.4 −4.4 −0.2 0.0
Mean 1.9 −0.7 1.5 −0.7 21.2 −3.5 −0.2 0.0
σ Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
mean Own Other Own Other Own Other Own Other
Panel C. Sensitivity of optimal tariffs w.r.t.  σ s 
Without lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 2.2 −0.6 2.2 −0.6 17.6 −2.9 1.1 −0.2
5.0 1.7 −0.4 1.7 −0.4 9.1 −1.5 1.1 −0.2
6.5 1.5 −0.2 1.5 −0.2 5.4 −0.9 1.1 −0.2
With lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 1.8 −0.6 1.5 −0.6 20.2 −3.4 −0.2 0.0
5.0 1.2 −0.4 0.9 −0.4 10.5 −1.7 −0.2 0.0
6.5 1.1 −0.3 0.7 −0.3 6.5 −1.1 −0.2 0.0
Notes: The entries under “gvt. welfare” are the percentage changes in G, the entries under “welfare” are the percent-
age changes in W, the entries under “wage” are the percentage changes in w normalized such that the average wage 
change across all countries is zero, and the entries under “profits” are the percentage changes in total profits due to 
changes in industry output. The entries under “own” are the effects on the tariff imposing country while the entries 
under “other” are the averages of the effects on all other countries. The last rows of panels A and B report averages. 
Panel C reports only such averages.
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country (“own”) as well as the averages of the effects on all other countries (“other”). 
Recall that  G j =  W j if  λ is = 1 ∀ i and s so that the changes in government welfare 
and overall welfare are identical here. As can be seen from the first to fourth column, 
each country can gain considerably at the expense of other countries by unilaterally 
imposing optimal tariffs. The average welfare gain of the tariff imposing country is 
2.2 percent. The average welfare loss of the other countries is 0.7 percent. The rea-
son each country can gain at the expense of other countries is that the terms-of-trade 
and profit shifting effects have a beggar-thy-neighbor character, as can be seen from 
the fifth to eighth column.19
Country sizes vary significantly in my sample, with the largest countries (European 
Union and Rest of World) being around eight times larger than the smallest coun-
tries (Brazil and India) in nominal income terms. This variation in country size mat-
ters for optimal tariffs just as one would expect. In particular, median optimal tariffs 
are positively related to country size, as one can see from Figure 1. Also, the trade 
policy externalities associated with optimal tariffs are positively related to country 
size, as one can see from columns two, four, six, and eight of panel A of Table 3. 
Japan is an outlier because of its extreme factual trade policy. Most notably, Japan 
imposes factual tariffs of up to 513 percent on rice which implies that factual tariffs 
are highly distortive so that a move to optimal tariffs also brings about sizeable 
efficiency gains.
The extreme protection of the Japanese rice industry is the result of the politi-
cal influence this industry enjoys as a key constituent of the Japanese Liberal 
Democratic Party.20 And political economy forces also provide a plausible explana-
tion for the cross-industry variation in factual tariffs in other countries. For exam-
ple, the five most protected US industries in the sample are sugar, dairy, leather 
products, wearing apparel, and textiles which are all perceived as having political 
clout. Interestingly, the most protected industries also tend to be associated with 
the highest elasticities as one might suspect from inspecting the industry ranking 
in Table 1. As a result, the cross-industry variation in factual tariffs differs from the 
cross-industry variation in optimal tariffs in the baseline case in which  λ is = 1 ∀ i 
and s with the rank correlation coefficient averaging −16 percent.
A natural approach to identifying the political economy weights would therefore 
be to match the cross-industry distribution of optimal tariffs to the cross-industry 
distribution of factual tariffs after controlling for their respective means. However, 
factual tariffs are the result of complex and unfinished trade negotiations so that their 
relationship to optimal tariffs is far from clear. I therefore instead match the cross-
industry distribution of optimal tariffs to the cross-industry distribution of nonco-
operative tariffs whenever measures of noncooperative tariffs are available from the 
MAcMap or TRAINS database.21 The MAcMap database is the source of GTAP’s 
19 I have also computed the effects of optimal tariffs on trade flows. On average, trade flows are predicted to fall 
by 30.8 percent for the tariff imposing country and by 7 percent for all other countries.
20 See, for example, a Japan Times article from February 20, 2011 entitled “The sticky subject of Japan’s rice 
protection.”
21 I refer to these tariffs as noncooperative tariffs because it is unclear whether they should be thought of as 
measures of optimal tariffs or Nash tariffs. Similarly, it is also unclear whether I should match the cross-industry 
distribution of optimal tariffs or the cross-industry distribution of Nash tariffs to the cross-industry distribution of 
noncooperative tariffs. While I choose optimal tariffs for simplicity, I also show below that the results would have 
looked very similar if I had chosen Nash tariffs instead.
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applied tariffs which I use as factual tariffs throughout. However, it also separately 
lists the components of applied tariffs including noncooperative tariffs whenever 
noncooperative tariffs are imposed. The TRAINS database is an additional source 
of tariff data which I consult only when noncooperative tariffs are unavailable from 
the MAcMap database.
The MAcMap database contains direct measures of noncooperative tariffs for 
China, Japan, and the United States. These are tariffs applied nondiscriminatorily 
against a number of non-WTO member countries with which China, Japan, or the 
United States do not have normal trade relations.22 They are known as “general rate” 
tariffs in the case of China and Japan, and as “column 2 tariffs” in the case of the 
United States. They are significantly higher than factual tariffs with the simple aver-
ages being 69 percent as opposed to 10 percent for China, 76 percent as opposed to 
21 percent for Japan, and 23 percent as opposed to 3 percent for the United States.23 
However, their ranking is highly correlated with the ranking of factual tariffs with 
the rank correlation coefficients being 49 percent for China, 80 percent for Japan, 
and 28 percent for the United States.
Moreover, the TRAINS database provides direct measures of noncooperative tar-
iffs for the European Union. They are known as “autonomous rate” tariffs and are 
obtained from Annex I of the EU’s Combined Nomenclature Regulation. Just like 
the abovementioned measures of noncooperative tariffs, these “autonomous rate” 
tariffs used to apply to non-WTO member countries with which the European Union 
did not have normal trade relations. However, the European Union no longer makes 
use of them and now simply applies its most-favored nation tariffs by default.24 The 
“autonomous rate” tariffs are again significantly higher than factual tariffs with the 
simple average being 25 percent as opposed to 8 percent. They are also again highly 
correlated with factual tariffs with the rank correlation coefficient being 78 percent.
Finally, it might be argued that the factual tariffs of Brazil and India reflect their 
noncooperative tariffs to some extent. This is because Brazil and India choose to set 
their factual tariffs well below the bound tariffs they have committed to in the WTO. 
In particular, the MAcMap database suggests that the average “water in the tariff,” 
i.e., the difference between bound and factual tariffs, is around 20 percentage points 
for Brazil and around 30 percentage points for India. Needless to say, these and the 
other measures of noncooperative tariffs have to be taken with a large grain of salt. 
However, it will turn out that all aggregate results are quite robust to the choice of 
political economy weights which will considerably mitigate this concern.
Figure 2 shows the result of matching the distribution of optimal tariffs to the 
distribution of noncooperative tariffs for the European Union, China, Japan, and the 
United States, and to the distribution of factual tariffs for Brazil, India, and the Rest 
22 The particular countries are Andorra, Bahamas, Bermuda, Bhutan, British Virgin Islands, British Cayman 
Islands, French Guiana, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Gibraltar, Monserrat, Nauru, Aruba, New Caledonia, 
Norfolk Island, Palau, Timor-Leste, San Marino, Seychelles, Western Sahara, and Turks and Caicos Islands for 
China; Andorra, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Lebanon, and Timor-Leste for 
Japan; and Cuba and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the United States.
23 The average reported for the United States column 2 tariffs might seem too low to readers closely familiar with 
US tariff data. Notice, however, that the average is taken over GTAP sectors which gives a lot of weight to agricul-
tural industries. The simple average over all HS 6-digit United States column 2 tariffs in my dataset is 32 percent.
24 In the rare instances in which the “autonomous rate” is lower than the bound most-favored nation rate, the 
European Union actually still applies the “autonomous rate,” albeit on a most-favored nation basis.
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of the World. The matching is conducted by minimizing the residual sum of squares 
between the optimal tariffs and the noncooperative or factual tariffs after controlling 
for their respective means.25 Since noncooperative tariffs are applied nondiscrimi-
natorily I also restrict the optimal tariffs to be applied nondiscriminatorily for the 
purpose of this exercise. As can be seen, the model is largely able to replicate the 
distributions of noncooperative and factual tariffs as one would expect given the 
number of free political economy parameters.26 However, it also overpredicts the 
25 A more detailed discussion of the algorithm can be found in the Appendix.
26 Given that there are as many free parameters as data points, one might expect the distributions of predicted 
optimal tariffs to be identical to the distributions of observed noncooperative and factual tariffs except for their 
means. Recall, however, that the political economy weights are constrained to be nonnegative so that this does 
not always have to be the case. In my application, this constraint only binds in the case of the EU’s wool industry 
which explains the slight outlier in the corresponding graph (industry rank 3). This occurs because the European 
Union imports the vast majority of its wool which makes the optimal tariff very inelastic with respect to the politi-
cal economy weight.
Figure 2. Optimal Tariffs with Lobbying
Note: The median optimal tariffs are 56.4 percent for the United States, 54.2 percent for Brazil, 60.7 percent for 
China, 69.0 percent for the European Union, 49.9 percent for India, 77.5 percent for Japan, and 68.9 percent for 
the Rest of the World.
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levels of noncooperative tariffs for all countries other than China, an issue which can 
be addressed by adjusting the elasticities of substitution, as I explain below.
Japan’s most extreme noncooperative tariffs are too close to prohibitive to be 
exactly matched by my method of computing optimal tariffs without imposing 
extreme convergence tolerances. For example, Japan’s noncooperative tariff on rice 
is 721 percent which is virtually indistinguishable from a tariff of, say, 800 percent 
as far as its quantitative implications are concerned. I therefore restrict each opti-
mal tariff corresponding to a noncooperative tariff higher than 225 percent to be at 
most as high as the noncooperative tariff itself and find the lowest possible political 
economy weight which makes the optimal tariff hit that upper bound. As can be 
seen from Figure 2, this procedure applies only to the most extreme noncooperative 
tariffs of Japan.
The resulting political economy weights are reported in the second to eighth 
column of Table 1 in which I have marked the five highest values for each coun-
try with boxes for better legibility. Overall, the estimates appear highly plausible. 
For example, the five most favored US industries are found to be wearing apparel, 
dairy, textiles, beverages and tobacco products, and wheat. With an average rank 
correlation of 70 percent, the political economy weights are highly correlated across 
countries. With an average rank correlation of 78 percent, they are also highly corre-
lated with the elasticities. To understand the latter correlation, recall that politically 
unmotivated governments impose lower tariffs in higher elasticity industries. As a 
result, even a completely flat schedule of observed noncooperative tariffs could only 
be rationalized with higher political economy weights in higher elasticity industries. 
What is more, observed noncooperative tariffs tend to be higher in higher elasticity 
industries as one might expect from inspecting the industry ranking in Table 1.27
Panel B of Table 3 lists the effects of unilaterally imposed optimal tariffs given 
the estimated political economy weights in exactly the same format as panel A. A 
comparison of the last rows of panels A and B as well as the medians reported in 
the notes to Figure 1 and Figure 2 reveals that the aggregate implications of optimal 
tariffs with lobbying are quite similar to the aggregate implications of optimal tariffs 
without lobbying. The unweighted welfare gains are now a bit smaller given that 
governments now maximize weighted welfare. Also, the median optimal tariffs are 
now a bit higher given that the optimal tariff distribution is now more extreme (the 
average of the median optimal tariffs reported in the note to Figure 2 is 62.4 per-
cent). The main difference is that profit shifting effects are now all but eliminated 
given that the cross-industry distribution of tariffs is now driven primarily by politi-
cal considerations.
Panel C of Table 3 explores the sensitivity of the results in panels A and B to 
alternative assumptions on the elasticity of substitution. In particular, it recalculates 
the averages reported in the last rows of panels A and B using scaled versions of 
the original elasticity estimates reported in Table 1, where the scaling is such that 
27 For a number of reasons, it is hard to compare these estimates to the ones obtained by Goldberg and Maggi 
(1999). First, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) estimate a dummy variable indicating whether or not an industry is politi-
cally organized, whereas I allow the political economy weights to vary continuously by industry. Also, Goldberg 
and Maggi (1999) restrict attention to US manufacturing industries only, whereas I consider agricultural and manu-
facturing industries around the world. Finally, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) use an SIC 3-digit industry classification 
which is hard to match to the GTAP sectors considered here.
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the elasticities average to the values displayed in the first column of panel C (recall 
that the original elasticity estimates reported in Table 1 average to 3.4 percent). The 
specific range is chosen to correspond to the range of aggregate trade elasticities 
suggested by Simonovska and Waugh (2014).28 As can be seen, the welfare effects 
of optimal tariffs are strongly decreasing in the elasticities which is a reflection of 
the fact that the optimal tariffs themselves are strongly decreasing in the elasticities. 
Intuitively, lower elasticities give countries more monopoly power in world markets 
which they optimally exploit through higher tariffs. In the case without lobbying, 
the average of the median optimal tariffs is equal to 56.8 percent if the mean elastic-
ity is 3.5, 34.3 percent if the mean elasticity is equal to 5.0, and 24.6 percent if the 
mean elasticity is equal to 6.5. In the case with lobbying, the average of the median 
optimal tariffs is equal to 60.1 percent if the mean elasticity is 3.5, 35.5 percent if the 
mean elasticity is equal to 5.0, and 25.6 percent if the mean elasticity is equal to 6.5.
Recalculating the last row of panel B involves recalibrating the political economy 
weights to ensure that the distribution of optimal tariffs continues to match the dis-
tribution of noncooperative or factual tariffs. The main effect of increasing the elas-
ticities is to decrease the variance of the political economy weights as it makes the 
optimal tariffs more sensitive to changes in the political economy weights. At the same 
time, the ranking of the political economy weights stays largely unchanged with the 
average rank correlation coefficient across specifications being 97 percent. Moreover, 
recalculating the last rows of panels A and B also involves repurging the original data 
from aggregate trade imbalances following the same procedure explained above.
Since optimal tariffs are strongly decreasing in the elasticities, increasing the elas-
ticities also reduces the differences between optimal tariffs and noncooperative or 
factual tariffs for all countries other than China for which the levels were already 
closely matched in Figure 2. For example, the optimal tariffs of the United States 
almost perfectly match the noncooperative tariffs of the United States in a version of 
Figure 2 drawn for the case in which the elasticities average to 6.5. In light of this, 
it is tempting to calibrate the average elasticity to minimize the differences between 
optimal tariffs and noncooperative or factual tariffs. Recall, however, that the mea-
sured noncooperative or factual tariffs are highly imperfect proxies for the actual 
noncooperative tariffs so that I do not pursue this here.29, 30
28 The trade elasticities are the partial equilibrium elasticities of trade flows with respect to trade costs and equal 
1 −  σ s here. Simonovska and Waugh (2014) obtain their results in the context of an Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
model, which means that their results do not exactly apply here. However, it is now well-understood that different 
gravity models share similar aggregate behaviors so that I still use their numbers as rough bounds.
29 By giving an extra weight to real profits in the government objective functions (3), one could also control the 
level of optimal tariffs from the political economy side. However, this would work in a highly implausible fashion 
which is why I refrain from it here. In particular, the level of optimal tariffs could then be decreased by increas-
ing the weights on real profits in all industries. To see this, consider a tariff reduction which is such that it leaves 
the scale of all industries unchanged. Such a tariff reduction would then increase real profits in all industries by 
reducing the aggregate price index while leaving nominal profits in all industries unchanged as nominal profits are 
directly proportional to industry scale. Essentially, governments would then cater to producer interests by subsidiz-
ing consumption since they cannot boost production in all industries at the same time.
30 To get a sense of how a version of the model without profit shifting effects behaves, I have also computed 
optimal tariffs in the baseline case without lobbying under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution is equal 
to 3.42 in all industries which is the average of my elasticity estimates from Table 1. In this case, optimal tariffs 
would be uniform across industries and have a median of 44 percent. They would increase welfare in the tariff 
imposing country by 1.5 percent on average and decrease welfare in all other countries by 0.5 percent on average. 
Of course, the prediction that optimal tariffs are uniform across industries should not be expected to generalize to 
richer  terms-of-trade only environments in which relative prices and relative wages are less closely linked.
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VI. Trade Wars
The above discussion of each country’s optimal tariffs assumes that the other 
countries do not retaliate which allows each country to benefit considerably at the 
other countries’ expense. I now turn to an analysis of the Nash equilibrium in which 
all countries retaliate optimally. The Nash tariffs are such that each government 
chooses its tariffs to maximize its objective function (3) given the tariffs of all other 
governments as well as conditions (10)–(13). They can be computed by iterat-
ing over the algorithm used to compute optimal tariffs, as I discuss in detail in the 
Appendix. I refer to optimal tariffs without retaliation as optimal tariffs and optimal 
tariffs with retaliation as Nash tariffs throughout.31
Figure 3 summarizes the Nash tariffs of each country for the baseline version in 
which  λ is = 1 ∀ i and s. It ranks all industries by elasticity of substitution and plots 
the Nash tariffs of each country with respect to all trading partners against the indus-
try rank. As can be seen, these Nash tariffs are very similar to the optimal tariffs 
from Figure 1. The median Nash tariff across all countries is 58.1 percent which is 
remarkably close to the average tariff of 50 percent typically reported for the trade 
war following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.32 This trade war is the only 
full-fledged trade war in economic history and therefore an interesting benchmark 
for me. Of course, it can only serve as a rough reference point given the differences 
in the set of players and the timing of the experiment. I will therefore also contrast 
the predicted Nash tariffs with the abovementioned measures of noncooperative tar-
iffs when I discuss the political economy case below.
Panel A of Table 4 lists the welfare effects of Nash tariffs in a similar format as 
panel A of Table 3. The main difference is that there is now only a single multilat-
eral tariff scenario under consideration in contrast to the seven unilateral ones from 
Table 3. As can be seen, countries can no longer benefit at one another’s expense 
and welfare falls across the board with the average loss equaling −2.4 percent. This 
loss is much higher than the average loss from unilaterally imposed optimal tariffs 
since all countries now impose noncooperative tariffs at the same time. Intuitively, 
each country now increases its import tariffs in an attempt to induce favorable 
 terms-of-trade and profit shifting effects. The end result is a large drop in trade vol-
umes which leaves all countries worse off.33
Notice that the welfare losses resulting from Nash tariffs are quite similar across 
countries with only Japan and the Rest of the World standing out. The relatively 
small welfare loss of Japan is again mainly due to Japan’s highly distortive factual 
tariffs which imply that Japan’s Nash tariffs are well below Japan’s factual tariffs 
in agricultural industries such as rice. The relatively large welfare loss of the Rest 
of the World is mainly due to the fact that the Rest of the World is by far the most 
open economy in the sample with an overall import share of 27 percent (the average 
across all other countries is 16 percent). Variation in openness is also the reason why 
31 I have experimented with many different starting values without finding any differences in the results which 
makes me believe that the identified Nash equilibrium is unique. This is, of course, subject to the well-known quali-
fication that complete autarky is also always a Nash equilibrium.
32 See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (2002, p. 43). The reported number is again the average of the median 
Nash tariffs reported in the note to Figure 3.
33 On average, trade flows are predicted to fall by 57.7 percent due to Nash tariffs.
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Figure 3. Nash Tariffs without Lobbying
Note: The median Nash tariffs are 59.6 percent for the United States, 56.4 percent for Brazil, 58.6 percent for China, 
59.1 percent for the European Union, 54.5 percent for India, 58.5 percent for Japan, and 59.7 percent for the Rest 
of the World.
Table 4—Nash Tariffs
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel A. Nash tariffs without lobbying
Brazil −1.9 −1.9 1.3 0.4
China −2.2 −2.2 0.5 −0.2
European Union −2.6 −2.6 2.7 −0.9
India −2.2 −2.2 −9.3 1.9
Japan −0.8 −0.8 −0.6 0.7
Rest of World −5.0 −5.0 −0.8 −0.6
United States −2.2 −2.2 6.3 −0.3
Mean −2.4 −2.4 0.0 0.2
(Continued )
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variation in country size is not as visible as in panel A of Table 3, since the larger 
countries also tend to be the more open ones here.
Figure 4 turns to the political economy case and plots the Nash tariffs computed 
using the political economy weights from above against the same measures of non-
cooperative and factual tariffs shown in Figure 2. As can be seen, the distribution of 
Nash tariffs is also quite closely in line with the distribution of noncooperative and 
factual tariffs even though they have not been directly matched.34 This suggests that 
the political economy weights would have been very similar if they had been chosen 
to match the distribution of Nash tariffs rather than the distribution of optimal tariffs 
to the distribution of noncooperative and factual tariffs. This is comforting since it 
is not entirely clear which point on the tariff reaction curves the measures of nonco-
operative and factual tariffs best represent.
Panel B of Table 4 summarizes the welfare effects of Nash tariffs in the politi-
cal economy case. A comparison of the last rows of panels A and B, as well as the 
medians reported in the notes to Figures 3 and 4, reveals that the aggregate impli-
cations of Nash tariffs are also quite similar with and without political economy 
forces. Similar to what we observed with respect to optimal tariffs, the unweighted 
welfare losses are a bit larger in the political economy case given that governments 
now maximize weighted welfare. Also, the median Nash tariffs are a bit higher in 
the political economy case given that the tariff distribution is now more extreme (the 
34 Just like the optimal tariffs, the Nash tariffs also overpredict the levels of noncooperative tariffs for all coun-
tries other than China. See the section on optimal tariffs for a discussion of how this issue can be addressed.
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel B. Nash tariffs with lobbying
Brazil −2.7 −2.5 −4.6 0.5
China −3.4 −2.9 −7.1 0.3
European Union −2.2 −2.7 5.6 −1.2
India −3.6 −3.3 −10.5 0.8
Japan −1.0 −2.8 11.4 −1.7
Rest of World −5.3 −5.6 −1.3 −0.1
United States −2.0 −2.4 6.5 −0.2
Mean −2.9 −3.2 0.0 −0.2
 σ mean Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel C. Sensitivity of Nash tariffs w.r.t.  σ s 
Without lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 −2.3 −2.3 0.0 0.2
5.0 −1.0 −1.0 0.0 0.3
6.5 −0.3 −0.3 0.0 0.2
With lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 −2.8 −3.0 0.0 −0.2
5.0 −1.5 −1.7 0.0 −0.1
6.5 −0.8 −1.1 0.0 −0.1
Notes: The entries under “gvt. welfare” are the percentage changes in G, the entries under 
“welfare” are the percentage changes in W, the entries under “wage” are the percentage 
changes in w normalized such that the average wage change across all countries is zero, and 
the entries under “profits” are the percentage changes in total profits due to changes in industry 
output. The last rows of panels A and B report averages. Panel C reports only such averages.
Table 4—Nash Tariffs (Continued )
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average of the median Nash tariffs reported in Figure 4 is 63.4 percent). Notice that 
the average profit shifting effects are very small even without lobbying which is the 
case because all governments attempt to boost their most profitable industries at the 
same time.35
Panel C of Table 4 explores the sensitivity of the results in panels A and B to 
alternative assumptions on the elasticity of substitution exactly in the same fashion 
as explained earlier for Table 3. As can be seen, the welfare effects of Nash tariffs 
are strongly decreasing in the elasticity of substitution just like the welfare effects of 
35 While the relatively high government welfare loss in the Rest of the World is again the result of its relatively 
high trade exposure, the relatively low government welfare loss of Japan is now driven by its relatively extreme 
political economy. In particular, Japan is effectively banning imports in its politically best connected industries 
which limits the losses in government welfare but significantly harms overall welfare.
Figure 4. Nash Tariffs with Lobbying
Note: The median Nash tariffs are 56.6 percent for the United States, 54.7 percent for Brazil, 62.9 percent for China, 
69.4 percent for the European Union, 54.1 percent for India, 77.6 percent for Japan, and 68.5 percent for the Rest 
of the World.
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optimal tariffs discussed above. Indeed, the average welfare loss from Nash tariffs 
almost goes to zero in the baseline version without lobbying. This is because high 
factual tariffs such as some of the agricultural tariffs imposed by Japan become 
more distortive the higher the elasticity so that a move to Nash tariffs also entails 
sizeable efficiency gains. Recall that all welfare changes are computed relative to 
factual tariffs and not relative to free trade as in much of the theoretical literature. 
The reason that the welfare effects of Nash tariffs are strongly decreasing in the elas-
ticity of substitution is again that the Nash tariffs themselves are strongly decreas-
ing in the elasticity of substitution. In the case without lobbying, the average of the 
median Nash tariffs is equal to 56.0 percent if the mean elasticity is 3.5, 34.4 percent 
if the mean elasticity is equal to 5.0, and 25.4 percent if the mean elasticity is equal 
to 6.5. In the case with lobbying, the average of the median Nash tariffs is equal to 
61.2 percent if the mean elasticity is 3.5, 36.2 percent if the mean elasticity is equal 
to 5.0, and 26.4 percent if the mean elasticity is equal to 6.5.36
VII. Trade Talks
The inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium creates incentives for international trade 
policy cooperation. I now turn to an analysis of such cooperation by characteriz-
ing the outcome of efficient multilateral trade negotiations. As will become clear 
shortly, there is an entire efficiency frontier so that I have to take a stance on the 
specific bargaining protocol. I adopt one in the spirit of symmetric Nash bargaining 
according to which all governments evenly split all efficiency gains. In particular, 
I solve max   G 1 s.t.   G j =   G 1 ∀ j starting at Nash tariffs, thereby invoking the same 
threat point as most of the theoretical literature. Moreover, I also report results start-
ing at factual tariffs and zero tariffs in order to quantify the scope for future mutu-
ally beneficial trade liberalization and assess how close global free trade is to the 
efficiency frontier.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show the world cooperative tariffs under these three regimes 
for the baseline version in which  λ is = 1 ∀ i and s. They rank all industries by the 
elasticity of substitution and plot the cooperative tariffs of each country with respect 
to all trading partners against the industry rank. As can be seen, the  cross-industry 
variation in the cooperative tariffs is very similar across the three figures while 
the cross-country variation is changing quite a bit. The cross-industry variation in 
the cooperative tariffs counteracts distortions in relative prices originating from 
 cross-industry variation in markups. The cross-country variation in the cooperative 
tariffs induces terms-of-trade effects which replicate international side payments 
and ensure that all efficiency gains are split equally as required by the bargaining 
protocol.
To better understand the cross-industry variation in cooperative tariffs, notice that 
the equilibrium in this economy is efficient as long as relative prices equal relative 
36 To get a sense of how a version of the model without profit shifting effects behaves, I have again also computed 
Nash tariffs in the baseline case without lobbying under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution is equal to 
3.42 in all industries which is the average of my elasticity estimates from Table 1. In this case, Nash tariffs would be 
uniform across industries and have a median of 43 percent. They would decrease welfare by 1.8 percent on average. 
Just like before, the prediction that Nash tariffs are uniform across industries should not be expected to generalize to 
richer terms-of-trade only environments in which relative prices and relative wages are less closely linked.
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marginal costs.37 If markups are the same across industries, this is the case with-
out policy intervention so that free trade is then first-best. If markups differ across 
industries, however, relative prices are distorted without policy intervention but can 
be fully corrected by taxing imports and domestic sales in the high elasticity indus-
tries and subsidizing imports and domestic sales in the low elasticity industries. This 
is also what governments attempt in the cooperative equilibrium with the important 
difference that they are given no access to domestic policy instruments. This is simi-
lar to the point of Flam and Helpman (1987).38
37 To see this, consider the effects of a fully symmetric increase in markups starting at the efficient benchmark 
where prices equal marginal costs. On the demand side, consumption would be unchanged for all varieties since 
relative prices would be unchanged and profits would be fully redistributed to consumers. On the supply side, output 
would be unchanged for all varieties since there is a fixed number of firms, a fixed supply of workers, and wages 
adjust to ensure full employment.
38 In the baseline version in which  λ is = 1 ∀ i and s, moving from Nash tariffs to cooperative tariffs therefore 
implies moving from a tariff schedule which is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution (governments attempt 
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Figure 5. Cooperative Tariffs without Lobbying Starting at Nash Tariffs
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To better understand the cross-country variation in cooperative tariffs, notice that a 
combination of import tariffs and import subsidies can induce terms-of-trade effects 
which replicate international side payments. As an illustration, consider the case of 
the United States and Japan. If the United States imposes an across-the-board import 
tariff, this improves the US terms-of-trade but also increases the prices of Japanese 
goods relative to US goods in the US market with the opposite occurring in Japan. 
If Japan now responds with the right across-the-board import subsidy, it is possible 
to further improve the US terms-of-trade but now decrease the prices of Japanese 
goods relative to US goods in the US market back to their original level with the 
opposite occurring in Japan. In this situation, Japan would then effectively make a 
side payment to the United States. This is essentially the point of Mayer (1981).
to shift profits) to one which is increasing in the elasticity of substitution (governments attempt to correct markup 
distortions).
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Figure 6. Cooperative Tariffs without Lobbying Starting at Factual Tariffs
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An unrealistic feature of the cooperative tariffs summarized in Figures 5, 6, and 
7 is that they include import subsidies which are rarely found in practice. However, 
ruling out import subsidies makes very little difference in terms of the quantitative 
results in the baseline version in which  λ is = 1 ∀ i and s. Panel A of Tables 5, 6, and 
7 therefore lists the effects of cooperative tariffs under the more realistic assumption 
that tariffs cannot be negative. These restricted cooperative tariffs look like a raised 
and truncated version of the unrestricted cooperative tariffs presented in Figures 5, 
6, and 7. Tables 5, 6, and 7 refer to negotiations starting at Nash tariffs, factual tar-
iffs, and free trade, and all changes are always computed relative to these respective 
starting points.39
39 Without ruling out import subsidies, the mean welfare effects would have been 3.5 percent, 0.6 percent, and 
0.05 percent; the mean wage effects would have been 0.0 percent, 0.0 percent, and 0.0 percent; and the mean profit 
effects would have been 0.3 percent, 0.4 percent, and 0.2 percent, for negotiations starting at Nash tariffs, factual 
tariffs, and zero tariffs, respectively. Comparing those numbers to the last row of panel A of Tables 5, 6, and 7 
reveals that ruling out import subsidies indeed makes very little difference here.
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Figure 7. Cooperative Tariffs without Lobbying Starting at Zero Tariffs
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As can be seen, trade negotiations starting at Nash tariffs increase each country’s 
welfare by 3.4 percent. Since this number relates the worst-case scenario to the 
best-case scenario, it can be viewed as an upper bound on the value of multilateral 
trade policy cooperation. The results for trade negotiations starting at factual tariffs 
suggest that around 85 percent of these gains have already been reaped during past 
trade liberalizations with future trade negotiations only permitting additional wel-
fare gains of 0.5 percent. Moreover, the results for trade negotiations starting at free 
trade suggest that free trade is very close to the efficiency frontier as the potential 
gains from such negotiations are negligibly small. This implies that tariffs are not 
an effective tool for correcting domestic distortions exactly as the standard targeting 
principle predicts.
The wage effects reported in panel A of Tables 5, 6, and 7 reflect the equilib-
rium side payments which ensure that all governments gain the same. For example, 
Brazil suffers less from the Nash equilibrium than other countries because it is rela-
tively closed to international trade. As a result, it faces lower tariffs than other coun-
tries in the cooperative equilibrium from Figure 5 which explains the  associated 
Table 5—Cooperative Tariffs Starting at Nash Tariffs
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel A. Cooperative tariffs without lobbying
Brazil 3.4 3.4 9.2 −0.7
China 3.4 3.4 0.0 −0.8
European Union 3.4 3.4 −2.1 1.0
India 3.4 3.4 5.8 −0.9
Japan 3.4 3.4 −2.7 1.4
Rest of World 3.4 3.4 −6.0 0.6
United States 3.4 3.4 −4.2 0.4
Mean 3.4 3.4 0.0 0.1
Panel B. Cooperative tariffs with lobbying
Brazil 3.6 3.5 10.7 −0.7
China 3.6 1.0 −4.7 −2.3
European Union 3.6 4.0 −2.7 1.4
India 3.6 3.6 5.7 −0.6
Japan 3.6 4.9 −0.8 1.7
Rest of World 3.6 4.2 −4.7 0.4
United States 3.6 4.1 −3.5 1.0
Mean 3.6 3.6 0.0 0.1
σ Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel C. Sensitivity of cooperative tariffs w.r.t.  σ s 
Without lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.1
5.0 2.2 2.2 0.0 −0.1
6.5 1.7 1.7 0.0 −0.2
With lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 3.5 3.5 0.0 0.1
5.0 2.3 2.2 0.0 0.0
6.5 1.8 1.7 0.0 0.1
Notes: The entries under “gvt. welfare” are the percentage changes in G, the entries under 
“welfare” are the percentage changes in W, the entries under “wage” are the percentage 
changes in w normalized such that the average wage change across all countries is zero, and 
the entries under “profits” are the percentage changes in total profits due to changes in industry 
output. The last rows of panels A and B report averages. Panel C reports only such averages.
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 terms-of-trade gains apparent in panel A of Table 5. Similarly, Japan gains a lot by 
reducing its high factual tariffs on rice and other agricultural products. This implies 
that it needs to make transfers to all other countries if the Nash bargaining protocol is 
to be satisfied, which explains the high tariffs it faces in the cooperative equilibrium 
from Figure 6 as well as the associated wage decline noted in panel A of Table 6.
Panel B of Tables 5, 6, and 7 turns to the welfare effects of cooperative tariffs in the 
political economy case, again focusing on the realistic scenario that tariffs must be 
nonnegative. A comparison of the last rows of panels A and B reveals that the aggre-
gate implications of cooperative tariffs are also quite similar with and without lob-
bying. The unweighted welfare gains from negotiations starting at  factual tariffs or 
free trade are now a bit smaller since governments now maximize weighted welfare. 
In contrast, the unweighted welfare gains from negotiations starting at Nash tariffs 
are now a bit larger because Nash tariffs are now associated with lower unweighted 
welfare. Interestingly, trade negotiations starting at Nash tariffs make households 
in all countries better off even though they are conducted by politically motivated 
Table 6—Cooperative Tariffs Starting at Factual Tariffs
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel A. Cooperative tariffs without lobbying
Brazil 0.5 0.5 6.1 −0.7
China 0.5 0.5 0.2 −0.9
European Union 0.5 0.5 2.7 0.3
India 0.5 0.5 −4.0 1.0
Japan 0.5 0.5 −9.4 1.8
Rest of World 0.5 0.5 1.8 −0.2
United States 0.5 0.5 2.8 0.3
Mean 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.2
Panel B. Cooperative tariffs with lobbying
Brazil 0.5 0.5 3.3 −0.1
China 0.5 −1.6 −8.0 −2.1
European Union 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.0
India 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.2
Japan 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.5
Rest of World 0.5 0.7 1.1 0.3
United States 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.0
Mean 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0
σ Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel C. Sensitivity of cooperative tariffs w.r.t.  σ s 
Without lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.2
5.0 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.1
6.5 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0
With lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0
5.0 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0
6.5 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
Notes: The entries under “gvt. welfare” are the percentage changes in G, the entries under “wel-
fare” are the percentage changes in W, the entries under “wage” are the percentage changes in w 
normalized such that the average wage change across all countries is zero, and the entries under 
“profits” are the percentage changes in total profits due to changes in industry output. The last 
rows of panels A and B report averages. Panel C reports only such averages.
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 governments. This is no longer true, however, for trade negotiations starting at fac-
tual tariffs or zero tariffs, specifically in the cases of China, India, and Japan.40
Panel B of Table 7 further reveals that free trade is quite close to the efficiency 
frontier even in the political economy case. In particular, government welfare only 
increases by 0.2 percent in all countries following trade negotiations starting at free 
trade. This suggests that a good rule of thumb for achieving efficiency in remaining 
trade negotiations might be to focus on tariff reductions in sectors in which factual 
tariffs remain high. One complication, however, is that a move to free trade does not 
make all governments better off relative to factual tariffs. For example, Indian gov-
ernment welfare would fall by 0.9 percent since Indian factual tariffs and optimal 
tariffs are closely aligned in the political economy case.
40 The strong political preferences of Japan also imply that restricting tariffs to be nonnegative is not as innocu-
ous here as it was in the benchmark case without political economy forces. Without that restriction, Japan would 
be able to make larger side payments to other countries thereby buying additional support for its rice and wheat 
industry and imposing significant distortions on its economy.
Table 7—Cooperative Tariffs Starting at Zero Tariffs
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel A. Cooperative tariffs without lobbying
Brazil 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.0
China 0.03 0.03 −0.2 0.2
European Union 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.0
India 0.03 0.03 −0.1 0.2
Japan 0.03 0.03 0.6 −0.2
Rest of World 0.03 0.03 −0.2 0.3
United States 0.03 0.03 −0.3 0.2
Mean 0.03 0.03 0.0 0.1
Panel B. Cooperative tariffs with lobbying
Brazil 0.2 0.28 1.4 0.6
China 0.2 −1.25 −3.1 −1.4
European Union 0.2 −0.01 0.8 −0.1
India 0.2 −0.86 −0.7 −0.7
Japan 0.2 −0.44 1.0 −0.5
Rest of World 0.2 0.28 1.0 0.5
United States 0.2 0.15 −0.4 1.0
Mean 0.2 −0.27 0.0 −0.1
σ Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel C. Sensitivity of cooperative tariffs w.r.t.  σ s 
Without lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 0.03 0.03 0.0 0.1
5.0 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.1
6.5 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.1
With lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 0.2 −0.26 0.0 −0.1
5.0 0.3 −0.29 0.0 0.1
6.5 0.4 −0.33 0.0 0.2
Notes: The entries under “gvt. welfare” are the percentage changes in G, the entries under 
“welfare” are the percentage changes in W, the entries under “wage” are the percentage 
changes in w normalized such that the average wage change across all countries is zero, and 
the entries under “profits” are the percentage changes in total profits due to changes in industry 
output. The last rows of panels A and B report averages. Panel C reports only such averages.
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Panel C of Tables 5, 6, and 7 explores the sensitivity of the results in panels A 
and B to alternative assumptions on the elasticity of substitution exactly in the same 
fashion as explained earlier for Tables 3 and 4. As can be seen, the gains from trade 
negotiations starting at Nash tariffs are decreasing in the elasticity while the gains 
from trade negotiations starting at factual tariffs are increasing in the elasticity. The 
gains from trade negotiations starting at Nash tariffs are decreasing in the elastic-
ity simply because the Nash tariffs themselves are decreasing in the elasticity. The 
gains from trade negotiations starting at factual tariffs are increasing in the elasticity 
simply because factual tariffs get more distortive the higher the elasticity.41
In practice, governments do not simply engage in multilateral Nash bargaining 
but instead follow a rules-based negotiation approach guided by the principles of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The most prominent one is the most-favored nation (MFN) principle which 
forces countries to impose the same tariff against all trading partners for any given 
traded product. A comprehensive assessment of the implications of this principle is 
difficult in the context of this paper since MFN is enforced at the tariff-line level and 
therefore does not have to hold within the broad industry categories considered here. 
Nevertheless, it seems useful to discuss the effects of imposing MFN to get a sense 
of some of the broader issues involved.
Table 8 reports the effects of imposing optimal tariffs subject to the constraint of 
MFN in the same format as Table 3 discussed above. As can be seen, the results are 
virtually identical with and without MFN, as one might have suspected from the lack 
of cross-country variation in Figure 1.42 Table 9 then turns to the effects of MFN 
versions of the Nash tariffs covered in Table 4. Again, the results are very similar 
with and without MFN, as one might have suspected from the lack of  cross-country 
variation in Figure 3.43 Overall, these results suggest that MFN by itself is hardly 
effective in pushing countries toward the efficiency frontier. Incidentally, this is 
41 To get a sense of how a version of the model without profit shifting effects behaves, I have again also computed 
cooperative tariffs in the baseline case without lobbying under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution is 
equal to 3.42 in all industries which is the average of my elasticity estimates from Table 1. In this case, cooperative 
tariffs would be uniform across industries. They would increase welfare by 2.5 percent, 0.5 percent, and 0.0 percent 
for trade negotiations starting at Nash tariffs, factual tariffs, and zero tariffs respectively with the latter result simply 
reflecting that free trade would then be on the efficiency frontier.
42 In the case without lobbying, the median MFN optimal tariffs are 56.2 percent for Brazil, 59.9 percent for 
China, 60.9 percent for the European Union, 54.0 percent for India, 59.6 percent for Japan, 63.0 percent for the 
Rest of the World, and 60.8 percent for the United States (the mean of these medians is 59.2 percent which becomes 
57.2 percent if the elasticity of substitution is scaled to average 3.5, 34.4 percent if the elasticity of substitution is 
scaled to average 5.0, and 24.7 percent if the elasticity of substitution is scaled to average 6.5). In the case with 
lobbying, the median MFN optimal tariffs are 54.2 percent for Brazil, 61.7 percent for China, 68.9 percent for the 
European Union, 49.9 percent for India, 77.8 percent for Japan, 68.7 percent for the Rest of the World, and 57.5 per-
cent for the United States (the mean of these medians is 62.7 percent which becomes 60.4 percent if the elasticity 
of substitution is scaled to average 3.5, 35.6 percent if the elasticity of substitution is scaled to average 5.0, and 
25.7 percent if the elasticity of substitution is scaled to average 6.5).
43 In the case without lobbying, the median MFN Nash tariffs are 56.4 percent for Brazil, 59.4 percent for China, 
58.7 percent for the European Union, 54.9 percent for India, 58.6 percent for Japan, 60.4 percent for the Rest 
of the World, and 60.0 percent for the United States (the mean of these medians is 58.3 percent which becomes 
56.2 percent if the elasticity of substitution is scaled to average 3.5, 34.5 percent if the elasticity of substitution is 
scaled to average 5.0, and 25.4 percent if the elasticity of substitution is scaled to average 6.5). In the case with 
lobbying, the median MFN Nash tariffs are 54.7 percent for Brazil, 63.6 percent for China, 69.1 percent for the 
European Union, 54.3 percent for India, 77.9 percent for Japan, 66.9 percent for the Rest of the World, and 57.8 per-
cent for the United States (the mean of these medians is 63.5 percent which becomes 61.2 percent if the elasticity 
of substitution is scaled to average 3.5, 36.4 percent if the elasticity of substitution is scaled to average 5.0, and 
26.6 percent if the elasticity of substitution is scaled to average 6.5).
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 consistent with the fact that the abovementioned “autonomous rate,” “general rate,” 
and “column 2” tariffs of the European Union, China, Japan, and the United States 
are all imposed nondiscriminatorily.
Tables 10, 11, and 12 list the effects of trade negotiations subject to the constraint 
of MFN in the same format as Tables 5, 6, and 7. Recall from the above discussion 
of Figures 5, 6, and 7 that cross-country variation in the cooperative tariffs induces 
terms-of-trade effects which replicate international side payments. Imposing MFN 
somewhat restricts such side payments which implies slightly lower gains from 
trade negotiations starting at Nash tariffs or factual tariffs. The main effect of impos-
ing MFN, however, is that it significantly reduces the difference between changes 
in government welfare and overall welfare for trade negotiations starting at Nash 
tariffs or factual tariffs in the political economy case. This is due to the fact that a 
restriction of side payments limits the governments’ ability to coordinate their sup-
port for each other’s politically influential industries.
Table 8—Optimal Tariffs under MFN
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
own other own other own other own other
Panel A. Optimal tariffs without lobbying under MFN
Brazil 1.1 −0.1 1.1 −0.1 18.2 −3.0 0.8 −0.0
China 1.8 −0.6 1.8 −0.6 17.6 −2.9 0.5 −0.1
European Union 1.9 −1.0 1.9 −1.0 22.4 −3.7 0.1 −0.2
India 1.7 −0.1 1.7 −0.1 8.7 −1.5 2.7 −0.1
Japan 4.0 −0.3 4.0 −0.3 18.6 −3.1 1.7 −0.1
Rest of World 2.8 −1.7 2.8 −1.7 19.0 −3.2 1.1 −0.6
United States 2.3 −0.9 2.3 −0.9 23.8 −4.0 0.6 −0.1
Mean 2.2 −0.7 2.2 −0.7 18.3 −3.1 1.1 −0.2
Panel B. Optimal tariffs with lobbying under MFN
Brazil 0.9 −0.1 1.0 −0.1 18.1 −3.0 0.3 −0.0
China 1.5 −0.4 1.5 −0.5 13.3 −2.2 0.1 −0.0
European Union 2.2 −1.2 1.7 −1.1 27.0 −4.5 −0.9 0.1
India 0.5 −0.0 0.7 −0.0 11.4 −1.9 0.6 −0.0
Japan 2.6 −0.4 1.0 −0.4 30.0 −5.0 −1.4 0.1
Rest of World 2.9 −1.7 2.5 −1.8 22.0 −3.7 −0.1 −0.2
United States 2.5 −0.9 2.1 −0.9 26.4 −4.4 −0.2 0.0
Mean 1.9 −0.7 1.5 −0.7 21.2 −3.5 −0.2 0.0
σ Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
mean own other own other own other own other
Panel C. Sensitivity of optimal tariffs w.r.t.  σ s under MFN
Without lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 2.2 −0.6 2.2 −0.6 17.6 −2.9 1.1 −0.2
5.0 1.7 −0.4 1.7 −0.4 9.0 −1.5 1.1 −0.2
6.5 1.5 −0.2 1.5 −0.2 5.4 −0.9 1.1 −0.2
With lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 1.8 −0.6 1.5 −0.6 20.3 −3.4 −0.2 0.0
5.0 1.2 −0.4 0.9 −0.4 10.5 −1.8 −0.2 0.0
6.5 1.1 −0.3 0.7 −0.3 6.5 −1.1 −0.2 0.0
Notes: The entries under “gvt. welfare” are the percentage changes in G, the entries under “welfare” are the percent-
age changes in W, the entries under “wage” are the percentage changes in w normalized such that the average wage 
change across all countries is zero, and the entries under “profits” are the percentage changes in total profits due to 
changes in industry output. The entries under “own” are the effects on the tariff imposing country while the entries 
under “other” are the averages of the effects on all other countries. The last rows of panels A and B report averages. 
Panel C reports only such averages.
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An additional implication of the MFN principle is that it “multilateralizes” trade 
negotiations between a subset of countries by forcing them to extend all negotiated 
tariff concessions to nonparticipating countries as well. This implication has been 
discussed quite controversially in the theoretical literature. Some authors argue that 
it undermines multilateral trade negotiations by allowing nonparticipating coun-
tries to free ride on the bargaining outcomes of participating ones (e.g., Caplin and 
Krishna 1988). Other authors argue that it solves a bilateral opportunism problem 
resulting from a trade bloc’s ability to manipulate its external terms-of-trade (e.g., 
Bagwell and Staiger 2005).44 While a comprehensive quantitative analysis of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this paper, a simple thought experiment nevertheless 
sheds some interesting light on them.
In particular, consider the trade war equilibrium in the baseline version in which 
λ is = 1 ∀ i and s and suppose that the European Union, Japan, and the United States 
44 See chapter 5 of Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for a detailed review of the relevant literature.
Table 9—Nash Tariffs under MFN
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel A. Nash tariffs without lobbying under MFN
Brazil −1.8 −1.8 2.0 0.5
China −2.3 −2.3 0.0 −0.2
European Union −2.5 −2.5 3.1 −0.9
India −2.1 −2.1 −9.3 1.9
Japan −0.7 −0.7 −0.7 0.8
Rest of World −5.0 −5.0 −1.0 −0.6
United States −2.2 −2.2 5.8 −0.3
Mean −2.4 −2.4 0.0 0.2
Panel B. Nash tariffs with lobbying under MFN
Brazil −2.5 −2.4 −3.7 0.5
China −3.5 −2.9 −7.4 0.3
European Union −2.1 −2.6 6.1 −1.2
India −3.6 −3.3 −10.5 0.8
Japan −1.1 −2.9 10.7 −1.7
Rest of World −5.3 −5.6 −1.4 −0.1
United States −2.1 −2.5 6.1 −0.2
Mean −2.9 −3.2 0.0 −0.2
 σ mean Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel C. Sensitivity of Nash tariffs w.r.t.  σ s under MFN
Without lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 −2.3 −2.3 0.0 0.2
5.0 −1.0 −1.0 0.0 0.3
6.5 −0.2 −0.2 0.0 0.2
With lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 −2.8 −3.0 0.0 −0.2
5.0 −1.5 −1.7 0.0 −0.1
6.5 −0.8 −1.1 0.0 −0.1
Notes: The entries under “gvt. welfare” are the percentage changes in G, the entries under 
“welfare” are the percentage changes in W, the entries under “wage” are the percentage 
changes in w normalized such that the average wage change across all countries is zero, and 
the entries under “profits” are the percentage changes in total profits due to changes in industry 
output. The last rows of panels A and B report averages. Panel C reports only such averages.
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reciprocally reduce their tariffs against one another by the same percentage while the 
other countries keep their trade war tariffs in place. Panel A of Figure 8 shows the 
average welfare effects of this tariff reduction under the assumption that the liberal-
izing countries also keep their trade war tariffs against all other countries in place. 
As can be seen, this non-MFN tariff reduction benefits the liberalizing countries and 
harms the other countries. The welfare loss of the other countries is explained by a 
deterioration of their terms-of-trade which can be seen from the associated relative 
wage effects in panel B of Figure 8. It is the result of a shift in US, EU, and Japanese 
consumer expenditure toward the cheaper liberalized goods.45
Suppose now that the European Union, Japan, and the United States undertake the 
same tariff reductions but extend them to the other countries according to the MFN 
45 The associated profit shifting effects are minimal since the tariff reduction occurs proportionately across 
industries.
Table 10—Cooperative Tariffs under MFN Starting at Nash Tariffs
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel A. Cooperative tariffs without lobbying under MFN
Brazil 3.3 3.3 10.5 −0.4
China 3.3 3.3 −0.3 −0.5
European Union 3.3 3.3 −2.3 0.9
India 3.3 3.3 5.2 −0.4
Japan 3.3 3.3 −2.9 1.2
Rest of World 3.3 3.3 −6.0 0.3
United States 3.3 3.3 −4.2 0.3
Mean 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.2
Panel B. Cooperative tariffs with lobbying under MFN
Brazil 3.4 3.3 10.2 −0.6
China 3.4 2.2 −1.0 −1.1
European Union 3.4 3.8 −3.6 1.2
India 3.4 3.4 4.2 −0.6
Japan 3.4 4.5 −0.7 1.3
Rest of World 3.4 4.0 −5.5 0.5
United States 3.4 3.8 −3.5 0.7
Mean 3.4 3.6 0.0 0.2
σ Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel C. Sensitivity of cooperative tariffs w.r.t.  σ s under MFN
Without lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 3.2 3.2 0.0 0.2
5.0 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.0
6.5 1.6 1.6 0.0 −0.1
With lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 3.3 3.5 0.0 0.2
5.0 2.0 2.1 0.0 0.1
6.5 1.5 1.7 0.0 0.1
Notes: The entries under “gvt. welfare” are the percentage changes in G, the entries under 
“welfare” are the percentage changes in W, the entries under “wage” are the percentage 
changes in w normalized such that the average wage change across all countries is zero, and 
the entries under “profits” are the percentage changes in total profits due to changes in industry 
output. The last rows of panels A and B report averages. Panel C reports only such averages.
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principle while the other countries still keep their trade war tariffs in place.46 As can 
be seen from panel C of Figure 8, the liberalizing countries first gain and then lose 
from this MFN-tariff reduction while the other countries are left much better off. The 
welfare gain of the other countries is explained by an improvement of their terms-
of-trade which can be seen from the associated relative wage effects in panel D of 
Figure 8. This is due to the fact that the liberalizing countries make tariff concessions 
to the other countries without receiving anything in return. Overall, MFN therefore 
seems to protect “outsider” countries from welfare losses associated with liberaliza-
tions among “insider” countries. However, it also makes “insider” liberalizations 
much less attractive by more than neutralizing their adverse external effects.
Readers familiar with the work of Bagwell and Staiger (2005) will recall 
that MFN neutralizes external terms-of-trade effects in their framework if the 
46 Recall that the trade war equilibrium is very similar with and without imposing MFN so that it does not really 
matter which one is taken as a staring point. For simplicity, I focus on the trade war equilibrium subject to MFN in 
all thought experiments captured in Figure 8.
Table 11—Cooperative Tariffs under MFN Starting at Factual Tariffs
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel A. Cooperative tariffs without lobbying under MFN
Brazil 0.3 0.3 3.3 −0.5
China 0.3 0.3 −0.6 −0.9
European Union 0.3 0.3 1.2 0.2
India 0.3 0.3 −5.9 1.0
Japan 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.5
Rest of World 0.3 0.3 0.5 −0.1
United States 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.5
Mean 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1
Panel B. Cooperative tariffs with lobbying under MFN
Brazil 0.3 0.3 2.5 −0.2
China 0.3 −0.5 −5.1 −1.1
European Union 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0
India 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.2
Japan 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Rest of World 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2
United States 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.3
Mean 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0
σ Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel C. Sensitivity of cooperative tariffs w.r.t.  σ s under MFN
Without lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1
5.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0
6.5 0.8 0.8 0.0 −0.1
With lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
5.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 −0.1
6.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 −0.2
Notes: The entries under “gvt. welfare” are the percentage changes in G, the entries under 
“welfare” are the percentage changes in W, the entries under “wage” are the percentage 
changes in w normalized such that the average wage change across all countries is zero, and 
the entries under “profits” are the percentage changes in total profits due to changes in industry 
output. The last rows of panels A and B report averages. Panel C reports only such averages.
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 liberalizing parties keep their bilateral terms-of-trade unchanged. While the thought 
experiment underlying Figure 8 simply considers proportional tariff cuts, the bilat-
eral  terms-of-trade of the liberalizing countries are still largely unchanged so that 
this does not explain why the Bagwell and Staiger (2005) result does not apply. 
Instead, the key is the presence of product differentiation which breaks the direct 
link between countries’ bilateral terms-of-trade and makes MFN tariff concessions 
excessive to the extent that the neutralization of external terms-of-trade effects is 
the goal. As an illustration, consider Chinese and Japanese electronics producers 
competing for customers in the United States and suppose that the United States 
and Japan agree to a reciprocal trade liberalization which leaves the world price of 
Japanese electronics unchanged:
If the United States reduces its tariffs against Japan by 10 percent, the price of 
Japanese electronics in the US market falls by 10 percent. The repercussions this 
has on the world price of Chinese electronics depend on the degree of substitut-
ability between Chinese and Japanese electronics. If they are perfect substitutes, as 
in Bagwell and Staiger (2005), the Chinese world price falls by 10 percent because 
Table 12—Cooperative Tariffs under MFN Starting at Zero Tariffs
Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel A. Cooperative tariffs without lobbying under MFN
Brazil 0.03 0.03 0.0 0.1
China 0.03 0.03 −0.2 0.2
European Union 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.0
India 0.03 0.03 −0.2 0.3
Japan 0.03 0.03 0.7 −0.1
Rest of World 0.03 0.03 −0.2 0.3
United States 0.03 0.03 −0.2 0.2
Mean 0.03 0.03 0.0 0.1
Panel B. Cooperative tariffs with lobbying under MFN
Brazil 0.1 0.17 0.6 0.5
China 0.1 −0.24 −0.3 −0.2
European Union 0.1 −0.10 0.2 −0.2
India 0.1 −0.30 −0.2 −0.3
Japan 0.1 −0.41 −0.6 −0.4
Rest of World 0.1 0.07 0.2 0.3
United States 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.4
Mean 0.1 −0.11 0.0 0.0
σ Δ gvt. welfare Δ welfare Δ wage Δ profits
Panel C. Sensitivity of cooperative tariffs w.r.t.  σ s under MFN
Without lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 0.03 0.03 0.0 0.1
5.0 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.1
6.5 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.1
With lobbying (all values are means)
3.5 0.09 −0.11 0.0 0.0
5.0 0.14 −0.15 0.0 0.1
6.5 0.20 −0.20 0.0 0.1
Notes: The entries under “gvt. welfare” are the percentage changes in G, the entries under 
“welfare” are the percentage changes in W, the entries under “wage” are the percentage 
changes in w normalized such that the average wage change across all countries is zero, and 
the entries under “profits” are the percentage changes in total profits due to changes in industry 
output. The last rows of panels A and B report averages. Panel C reports only such averages.
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otherwise Chinese electronics become uncompetitive in the US market. If they 
are imperfect substitutes, as in the model developed here, the drop in the Chinese 
world price is less extreme because Chinese electronics are then less susceptible to 
Japanese competition. While a 10 percent (i.e., MFN) tariff reduction against China 
is therefore required to neutralize the negative effect of the US-Japanese trade liber-
alization on the Chinese world price with perfect substitutes, such a tariff reduction 
is excessive with imperfect substitutes, which explains my findings in Figure 8.47
VIII. Conclusion
I proposed a flexible framework for the quantitative analysis of noncooperative 
and cooperative trade policy which nests traditional, new trade, and political econ-
omy motives for protection. I used this framework to provide a first comprehensive 
quantitative analysis of noncooperative and cooperative trade policy, addressing 
some natural questions emerging from the theoretical trade policy literature. I began 
47 While I only provide an intuitive discussion of this point in the interest of brevity, a formal analysis is available 
from me upon request.
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by considering optimal tariffs, i.e., the tariffs countries would impose if they did 
not have to fear any retaliation. I then turned to an analysis of Nash tariffs, i.e., 
the tariffs countries would impose in a worldwide trade war in which their trading 
partners retaliated optimally. I finally investigated cooperative tariffs, i.e., the tariffs 
countries would negotiate to in efficient trade negotiations with and without being 
restricted by the GATT/WTO’s most-favored nation clause.
The interpretation of my results depends on whether the framework is taken as a 
maintained or tested hypothesis. In the former case, they can be viewed as answers 
to questions of immediate policy relevance: for example, as revealing what would 
have happened if a trade war had broken out in the wake of the recent financial cri-
sis; or as suggesting how much there is to gain from future multilateral trade nego-
tiations. In the latter case, they can be interpreted as suggestive of the plausibility of 
some of the leading models of trade policy making: for example, as demonstrating 
that the predicted noncooperative tariffs can be brought in line with observed non-
cooperative tariffs by choosing plausible political economy weights; or as showing 
that the underlying trade policy externalities can be sufficiently strong to reasonably 
justify a lengthy process of multilateral trade negotiations.
Given the near-absence of prior quantitative analyses of noncooperative and coop-
erative trade policy, the framework could be extended in many ways and used to 
address a whole host of related questions emerging from the large qualitative trade 
policy literature. As one of many examples, one could elaborate on the role played 
by the GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination as formalized 
by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and ask whether they are helpful or harmful for 
achieving and maintaining global efficiency. This could entail a quantitative analysis 
of the long-standing debate associated with Bhagwati (1991) of whether free trade 
agreements, which are allowed under GATT/WTO rules as an important exception 
to the principle of nondiscrimination, represent building-blocks or stumbling-blocks 
on the way toward full multilateral cooperation.
Appendix
A. Data
My main data source is the eighth version of the Global Trade Analysis Project 
database (GTAP 8) from which I take industry-level trade, production, and tariff 
data for the year 2007. The GTAP 8 database is a carefully cleaned, fully docu-
mented, publicly available, and globally consistent database covering 129 countries 
and 57 industries which span the agricultural, manufacturing, and service sectors 
of the economy. The GTAP 8 database is itself based on a number of underlying 
databases. In particular, its trade data is mainly drawn from the UN’s Comtrade 
database, its production data is mainly built from national input-output tables, and 
its tariff data is mainly taken from the International Trade Centre’s Market Access 
Map database. The database is documented in Narayanan, Aguiar, and McDougall 
(2012) which can be accessed directly from the GTAP website under https://www.
gtap.agecon.purdue.edu.
For my estimation of the demand elasticities, I further make use of the UN’s 
Comtrade trade data for the time period 1994–2008 which covers most countries 
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in the world. The data is originally at the SITC-Rev2 4-digit level and I convert 
it, first, to the SITC-Rev3 4-digit level using a concordance from the Center for 
International Data at UC Davis and, second, to the GTAP sector level using a con-
cordance which I manually constructed with the help of various concordances avail-
able from the GTAP website. This involved combining the original GTAP sectors 
“raw milk” and “dairy products” into a new GTAP sector “raw and processed dairy,” 
the original GTAP sectors “paddy rice” and “processed rice” into a new GTAP sec-
tor “raw and processed rice,” and the original GTAP sectors “raw and processed 
sugar” and “sugar cane, sugar beet” into a new GTAP sector “sugar.”
For my calibration of the political economy weights of China, Japan, and the 
United States, I also make direct use of the International Trade Centre’s Market 
Access Map database (MAcMap). The MAcMap data provides exhaustive and con-
sistent measures of tariff protection across the world. Particular care has been taken 
to transform specific tariffs into ad valorem equivalents which is especially relevant 
for agricultural industries. While the database includes the measure of noncoopera-
tive tariffs described in the main text for China for the year 2007, I have to use data 
from the year 2005 for the United States and Japan. A small number of observations 
are missing for Japan which I replace with Japan’s applied MFN rate. The data is 
originally at the HS 6-digit level and I convert it to the GTAP sector level using 
a concordance available from the GTAP website. The database is documented in 
Guimbard et al. (2012).
For my calibration of the political economy weights of the European Union, I 
make use of the UN’s Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) data-
base which is made available using the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) 
software of the World Bank. The database does not contain the measure of non-
cooperative tariffs described in the main text for the year 2007, so I use the next 
closest alternative which is from the year 2000. The data is originally at the 
HS 6-digit level and I convert it to the GTAP sector level using a concordance from 
the  WITS-TRAINS website.
B. Elasticity Estimation
I estimate the import demand elasticities using the method of Feenstra (1994) 
which identifies them from variation in the variances and covariances of demand and 
supply shocks across countries and over time. I base my estimation on the instruc-
tions in Feenstra (2010) in which the method is particularly clearly explained. My 
estimating equation is equation (2.21) in Feenstra (2010) which I estimate using 
weighted least squares following the code provided in Appendix 2.2 of Feenstra 
(2010). However, I do not focus on a single importer, but pool across the main 
importers considered in my analysis.
Specifically, I pool across the importers Brazil, China, India, Japan, the United 
States, and the EU-25 countries Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom. I use all exporters available in 
the data. In my estimation, all results turn out to be real numbers so that I do not 
need to resort to the grid search method proposed by Broda and Weinstein (2006).
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Given that profit shifting effects feature prominently in my analysis, one might won-
der how the cross-industry variation in markups implied by my elasticity estimates 
compares to the cross-industry variation in other markup estimates in the literature. 
To address this, I have compared the cross-country averages of the markup estimates 
reported in Tables 3 and 4 of Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996) to the markup esti-
mates implied by the elasticity estimates in my Table 1. This was possible only for 23 
of the 33 industries I consider since Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996) do not pro-
vide estimates for agricultural industries. Encouragingly, the estimates are positively 
related with only one industry clearly standing out (beverages and tobacco products). 
The overall correlation is 30 percent if the outlier is included and 45 percent otherwise.
C. Elimination of Aggregate Trade Imbalances
To purge the trade data of aggregate trade imbalances, I essentially replicate the 
original Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007) exercise using my model. In particular, 
I introduce aggregate trade imbalances as nominal transfers into the budget con-
straints and allow them to change exogenously so that equation (13) becomes
(C1)    Xj =   w j  L j  _ X j     wj +  ∑ i 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   t ijs  T ijs  _ X j     t ijs  (  τijs ) 
− σ s   (   wi  _   Pjs  ) 1− σ s    Xj 
 +  ∑ 
s
 
 
   π js  _ X j     πjs −  
N X j 
 _ X j    ˆ  NXj ,
where N X i ≡  ∑ j   ∑ s   ( T ijs −  T jis ) is taken from the data. I then use equations (10), (11), (12), and (C1) to solve for the general equilibrium effects   wi ,   Xi ,   Pis ,   πis 
resulting from setting N X j ′ = 0 while keeping all tariffs unchanged. I finally use 
these general equilibrium effects to calculate the effects on trade flows using the 
relationship   Tijs =  (  wi ) 1− σ s   (  Pjs )  σ s −1   Xj , which delivers a trade matrix without aggre-
gate trade imbalances.
Aggregate trade imbalances are quite large in the raw data. In particular, exports 
minus imports as a ratio of exports plus imports equal 17 percent for Brazil, 21 per-
cent for China, 8 percent for the European Union, −4 percent for India, 28 percent 
for Japan, −9 percent for the Rest of the World, and −22 percent for the United 
States. Given the elasticities listed in Table 1, the predicted changes in exports and 
imports resulting from an elimination of aggregate trade imbalances are −15 percent 
and 20 percent for Brazil, −17 percent and 28 percent for China, −9 percent and 
6 percent for the European Union, 1 percent and −8 percent for India, −18  percent 
and 44 percent for Japan, 6 percent and −11 percent for the Rest of the World, and 
16 percent and −26 percent for the United States.
As indicated in the main text, calculating the counterfactual effects of trade policy 
changes using the purged data and equations (10), (11), (12), and (13) has two main 
advantages over the standard approach which would call for using the raw data and 
equations (10), (11), (12), and (C1) with aggregate net exports kept unchanged. 
First, the assumption of constant aggregate trade imbalances leads to extreme 
general equilibrium adjustments in response to high tariffs and cannot be true in 
the limit as tariffs approach infinity. Second, the assumption of constant nominal 
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 transfers implies that it matters what nominal units they are measured in since this 
affects how real transfers change in counterfactuals.
While the first point should be obvious, the second point may not be immediately 
clear. To see the problem, notice that country j ’s real income depends on  
N X j 
 _ P j   in the 
presence of aggregate trade imbalances if they are introduced as nominal transfers 
into the budget constraints. How real income changes in counterfactuals therefore 
depends on what units N X j is measured in. In equation (C1), I have followed the lit-
erature and simply assumed that N X j is measured in units of the numeraire in which 
case the problem can be detected by trying out different numeraires. Notice that 
N X j can generally not be held fixed in real terms since it also has to satisfy the global 
adding up constraint  ∑ j  N X j = 0. Notice also that units are not an issue in the origi-
nal Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007) exercise since aggregate net exports are then 
set equal to zero anyway.
D. Algorithm
As indicated in the main text, calculating disaggregated noncooperative and coop-
erative tariffs is very intensive computationally due to the high dimensionality of 
the problem which has been a major barrier to progress in the area. I overcome this 
barrier with a combination of modern computing power and an efficient algorithm 
based on the idea of mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints as 
formulated in Su and Judd (2012). Using a high-end desktop computer and stan-
dard MATLAB software, it takes about four days to calculate all results which are 
reported in the paper.
I compute US optimal tariffs by maximizing the government’s objective func-
tion (3) subject to the equilibrium conditions (10)–(13) using the algorithm sug-
gested by Su and Judd (2012). To minimize the dimensionality of the problem, I do 
not literally use equations (10)–(13) but substitute first for   πis using equation (10) 
and then for   Pjs using equation (12). As an alternative, I have also experimented with 
computing optimal tariffs directly from the first-order conditions which can also be 
manipulated in the spirit of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007). However, I eventually 
abandoned this approach since it did not sufficiently improve performance to justify 
the substantial added complication.
I compute world Nash tariffs using a similar approach as Perroni and Whalley 
(2000) and Ossa (2011). Starting at factual tariffs, I compute each country’s optimal 
tariffs, then impose these optimal tariffs, and let each country reoptimize given all 
other countries’ optimal tariffs, and so on, until the solution converges in the sense 
that no country has an incentive to deviate from its tariffs. I have experimented with 
many different starting values without finding any differences in the result which 
makes me believe that the identified Nash equilibrium is unique. This is, of course, 
subject to the well-known qualification that complete autarky is also always a Nash 
equilibrium.
I compute world cooperative tariffs by maximizing   G 1 subject to the equilibrium 
conditions (10)–(13) as well as the condition that   G j =   G 1 for all j using again the 
algorithm suggested by Su and Judd (2012). I either start from Nash tariffs, factual 
tariffs, or zero tariffs and again substitute first for   πis using equation (10) and then 
10_A20120527_10412.indd   4143 11/11/14   3:25 PM
4144 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW dECEMbER 2014
for   Pjs using equation (12) to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. As dis-
cussed in the main text, there is an entire frontier of efficient tariffs due to the exis-
tence of de facto side payments and restricting   G j =   G 1 for all j can be thought of as 
finding the point on that frontier which also lies on a 45 degree line from the origin.
I compute the political economy weights using a simple iterative procedure. 
Starting with an initial guess, I always increase the political economy weights in 
industries in which the predicted optimal tariff is below the targeted noncoopera-
tive tariff, and decrease the political economy weights in industries in which the 
predicted optimal tariff is above the targeted optimal tariff, always controlling for 
the cross-industry mean. I continue this procedure until the distribution of predicted 
optimal tariffs converges to the distribution of targeted noncooperative tariffs, as in 
Figure 2. For Japan’s most extreme noncooperative tariffs, I follow a slightly modi-
fied procedure as explained in the main text.
E. Derivations
Derivation of Equation (14 ).—Equilibrium conditions (8) and ( 9) can be approx-
imated as
(E1)  Δ P js  _ P js   ≈  ∑ i 
 
  τ ijs  T ijs  _ X j    ( Δ w i  _ w i   +  Δ τ ijs  _ τ ijs   ) 
(E2)    Δ X j  _ X j   ≈  
 w j  L j 
 _ X j    
Δ w j 
 _ w j   +  ∑ i 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   t ijs  T ijs  _ X j    ( Δ t ijs  _ t ijs   +  Δ T ijs  _ T ijs   ) +  ∑ s     π js  _ X j    Δ π js  _ π js   .
These approximations imply
(E3)  Δ P j  _ P j   ≈  ∑ i 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   T ijs  _ X j    
Δ p is  _ p is   +  ∑ i 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   t ijs  T ijs  _ X j    
Δ p is  _ p is   +  ∑ i 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   t ijs  T ijs  _ X j    
Δ t ijs 
 _ t ijs   
(E4)  Δ X j  _ X j   ≈  ∑ i 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   T ijs  _ X j    
Δ p js 
 _ p js   +  ∑ s 
 
   π js  _ X j    ( Δ π js  _ π js   −  Δ p js  _ p js   ) 
 +  ∑ 
i
 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   t ijs  T ijs  _ X j    
Δ T ijs 
 _ T ijs   +  ∑ i 
 
 ∑ 
s
 
 
   t ijs  T ijs  _ X j    
Δ t ijs 
 _ t ijs   ,
which immediately combines to equation (14) since  Δ W j  _ W j   ≈  
Δ X j 
 _ X j   −  
Δ P j 
 _ P j   . Notice 
that changes in profits which are due to changes in prices are attributed to the 
 terms-of-trade effect. Notice also that changes in the price index which directly 
result from changes in tariffs cancel with changes in tariff revenue which directly 
result from changes in tariffs.
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